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I. Introduction
As the Internet becomes more important for
commerce, Internet Web sites are playing a more
central role in most companies’ business plans.
An especially elegant case has been made for the
‘‘Internet-only’’ business model in the banking in-
dustry. Overhead expenses can be reduced by jet-
tisoning physical branch offices. Banks can use the
resulting savings to reduce their loan interest rates
or increase their deposit interest rates, attracting
new customers without sacrificing earnings. The
web-based distribution focus allows banks to enter
new geographic markets without the costs of ac-
quiring existing banks or starting up new branches,
further increasing growth potential.
Nearly half of all U.S. banks and thrifts were
operating transactional Internet Web sites at the
beginning of 2002.1 But most of these firms have
(Journal of Business, 2005, vol. 78, no. 3)
B 2005 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0021-9398/2005/7803-0006$10.00
893
* The views expressed here are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago or the Federal Reserve System. I thank Dan Aaronson,
David Becher, Allen Berger, Tammy Berry, Rob Bliss, Cynthia
Bonnette, Liz Cooperman, Doug Evanoff, Benton Gup, Curt
Hunter, Jim Moser, Dan Nolle, Evren Ors, Mark Schittig, Soren
Sorescu, Dan Sullivan, Rick Sullivan, Larry Wall, and an anon-
ymous reviewer for helpful comments, and Nancy Andrews and
Sue Yuska for their assistance with the data. Contact the author at
robert.deyoung@frbchi.org.
1. A transactional Web site allows customers access to bank-
ing services without leaving their homes or offices. The most
basic transactional Web sites allow customers to check account
balances and transfer funds between accounts. More-advanced
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adopted a ‘‘click-and-mortar’’ business model in which an Internet Web
site is used to complement existing brick andmortar branches. Only a few
dozen banks and thrifts have adopted a pure Internet-only strategy that
eschews physical branches entirely; by-and-large, these firms have gen-
erated sub-par earnings. For every Internet-only bank or thrift that has
achieved marginal levels of profitability, another has exited the market
through liquidation or acquisition or has abandoned the pure Internet-
only business model and established physical branches. Government reg-
ulators have become increasingly risk averse with banks and thrifts that
deploy, or wish to deploy, this business model.
This article analyzes the financial performance of a dozen Internet-
only banks and thrifts that started up between 1997 and 2001. Newly
chartered (de novo) Internet-only banks and thrifts provide a clean test
of the Internet-only business model, because unlike a bank that converts
from a branchingmodel to an Internet-only model, their financial perfor-
mance is unaffected by any production structures or client relationships
left over from a preexisting business model. To separate the perfor-
mance effects of the Internet-only model from the performance effects
of ‘‘newness,’’ a sample of 644 branching banks and thrifts that also
started up between 1997 and 2001 are used as a performance benchmark.
The analysis attempts to identify which components of the Internet-only
business model have worked well and which have worked poorly, de-
termine why some banks and thrifts have been able to deploy this model
more successfully than others, and ascertain whether the Internet-only
business model could be economically viable for banks and thrifts in
the long run, despite its poor short-run performance. (For the remainder
of this article the generic term banks often is used in place of banks and
thrifts, and the terms startup bank and de novo bank are used inter-
changeably.) Although the focus here is on Internet-only banks and the
potential viability of the Internet-only business model, some tentative
inferences about the economics of the click-and-mortar business model
can be drawn from the empirical results.
This article also introduces a general intuitive framework for ana-
lyzing the performance of startup firms that use new or nontraditional
technologies. For a typical startup firm that uses existing technology,
the process by which accumulated experience is transformed into im-
proved financial performance is characterized as general experience ef-
fects, and the process by which increased firm size is transformed into
improved financial performance is characterized as general scale effects.
However, a startup firm that uses a new or nontraditional technology may
internalize additional experience effects or additional scale effects. These
Web sites allow customers to open new accounts, apply for loans, manage investments,
receive bills, and pay bills. The point estimate of ‘‘nearly half of all U.S. banks and thrifts’’
is based on the 49.7% Internet Web site adoption rate at national banks as of 2001:Q4
(source: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency staff ).
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processes are characterized as technology-based experience effects and
technology-based scale effects. The empirical analysis tests for the exis-
tence and estimates the magnitude of these four effects for startup banks
and thrifts. If either technology-based experience effects or technology-
based scale effects exist and are substantial for newly chartered Internet-
only banks, then the performance of these banks may improve over time and
the Internet-only business model could prove to be economically viable.
The empirical analysis applies an assortment of estimation techniques
and regression specifications to quarterly time-series cross-section finan-
cial data. Given the small number of Internet-only banks and thrifts avail-
able for testing, care is taken to ensure that the results are not driven by
a small number of outlying observations or by the idiosyncrasies of an
individual bank or thrift. By and large, these alternative tests generate
robust results. On average, Internet-only startup banks are substantially
less profitable than branching bank startups. The typical Internet-only
bank successfully executes some elements of the business model (e.g.,
rapid growth, better prices on loans and deposits) but not others (e.g.,
lower overhead expenses). Although there is little evidence that Internet-
only startups enjoy steeper learning curves than traditional startup banks,
the data suggest that Internet-only banks have access to deeper scale econ-
omies than branching banks—and as a result, the initial performance
gapsbetween the two sets of banksnarrowas the banks grow larger. These
effects are strongest for a subset of arguably better-run Internet-only
‘‘survivor’’ banks that are (as of the drafting of this article) still actively
pursuing an Internet-only business strategy. However, because Inter-
net bank startups hold relatively more equity capital than traditional bank
start-ups—to fund rapid expected asset growth and satisfy relatively
more-stringent regulatory standards—these performance gains have not
yet translated into improved rates of return for investors in these ventures.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Section II provides
a brief introduction to the Internet-only business model, documents the
financial performance of banks and thrifts that have implemented this
strategy, and reports on the regulatory environment facing these firms.
Section III reviews some of the previous literature on topics that play a
central role in this study: learning and experience effects, bank scale
economies, and Internet bank performance. Section IV presents an in-
tuitive framework for identifying differential experience effects and
scale effects at traditional startup firms and innovative startup firms.
Section V describes the data. Section VI provides a preliminary analysis
of the data and generates some evidence consistent with the existence of
technology-based experience and scale effects at Internet-only banks.
Section VII presents the statistical models used in the main empirical
tests, and section VIII presents the results of those tests. Section IX
summarizes the article and draws some forward-looking conclusions for
the role of the Internet in the banking industry.
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II. The Internet Banking Environment
The Internet distribution channel can add value to banking franchises
in a number of ways, depending on whether it is used to augment physi-
cal branches (click-and-mortar banks) or in place of physical branches
(Internet-only banks). The strategic core of the click-and-mortar bank-
ing model is to route standardized, low-value-added transactions (e.g.,
bill payment, balance inquiries, account transfers, credit card lending)
through the inexpensive Internet channel, while routing specialized, high-
value-added transactions (e.g., small business lending, personal trust
services, investment banking) through the more expensive branch chan-
nel. By providing an option for customers who want to do some but not
all of their banking over the Internet, a click-and-mortar bank may be
better able to retain its most-profitable customers. In contrast, the stra-
tegic core of the Internet-only business model is to reduce overhead
expenses by completely eliminating the physical branch channel. If this
results in lower fixed costs, Internet-only banks can set narrower vari-
able margins (by paying higher deposit rates or charging lower fees and
lower loan rates) but still maintain normal returns on assets and equity.
Narrower margins should grow the bank faster by bidding customers
away from competitors, resulting in faster earnings growth.
But the Internet is not merely a distribution channel for banks: adopt-
ing an Internet Web site can affect a bank’s production function and
alter its productmix, and these effects are likely to be strongest at Internet-
only banks. Internet-only banks are poorly suited for ‘‘relationship
lending,’’ in which risk is assessed via personal knowledge and direct
monitoring of idiosyncratic borrowers (e.g., small business loans or farm
loans) and are better suited for ‘‘transactions lending’’ inwhich borrowers
apply for loans on-line, risk is assessed via automated credit scoring
models and controlled via large numbers diversification and securitiza-
tion of relatively homogeneous credits (e.g., mortgage loans, auto loans,
andcredit card loans).Thus, the choiceof adistribution strategy—andbyex-
tension, the choice of a loan production process—is likely to have impli-
cations for optimal bank size. Because automated lending technology
exhibits a low ratio of variable costs to fixed costs, Internet-only banks
may have access to greater scale economies than traditional branching
banks.
Most Internet-only banking franchises in the United States have
struggled for profitability.2 Some have exited the market, via either
2. A sampling of the problems encountered by Internet banks includes difficulty retaining
core deposits, low revenues from cross-selling, high expenses to provide depositors access to
foreign ATMs, and higher than expected overhead expenses for marketing, technological
infrastructure, and 24-hour call centers. See DeYoung (2001) for a detailed discussion of the
shortfalls of the Internet-only banking model.
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acquisition, voluntary liquidation, or regulatory closure.3 Others have re-
mained in the market but changed strategies, augmenting their transac-
tional Web sites with physical branches.4 Similarly, a number of the
large banking companies that launched ‘‘trade name’’ Internet-only ven-
tures have integrated these business units back into the main bank.5 How-
ever, a small number of Internet-only banking franchises have achieved
some measure of profitability and (at the time this article was prepared)
remain committed to this business model in the long run. Ironically,
anecdotal evidence suggests that ‘‘old-fashioned’’ management prac-
tices like cost control, conservative growth, and strategic focus are
important keys to success for these ‘‘new-fashioned,’’ high-technology
banks.6
Government regulators have increasingly paid close attention to
Internet-only banks, because these banks tend to be young, grow rapidly,
and have lower than average earnings. To support rapid asset growth
and absorb early losses, regulatory authorities require higher levels of
startup capital before approving a new Internet-only bank charter, and
bank supervisors require higher capital-to-asset ratios while these banks
are young.7 Some Internet-only bankers have claimed that processing
times for charter applications and deposit insurance applications are
substantially slower and supervisors tend to micromanage their activi-
ties more so than at traditional banks.8 Whether these supervisory and
regulatory restrictions are necessary for Internet-only banks to be safe
and sound or supervisors and regulators are being risk averse because the
performance characteristics of this new business model are not yet fully
known is not clear on balance. Excessively tight supervision and regu-
lation imposes direct costs on the first generation of Internet-only banks
and, by potentially stifling innovation or slowing the rate of innovation,
3. For example, Lighthouse Bank (an Internet-only commercial bank) was acquired by
Brookline Savings Bank in July 2001, G&L Bank (an Internet-only thrift) filed an appli-
cation with its regulator to voluntarily liquidate in October 2001, and NextBank (an Internet-
only credit card bank) was closed by the FDIC in February 2002.
4. For example, ClarityBank.com switched from an Internet-only strategy to a click-and-
mortar strategy in the latter half of 2001 and changed its name to National American Bank in
2002.
5. A trade-name bank is a separately managed but not separately chartered or capitalized
Internet-only subsidiary of a traditional branching bank. The most notable example of a
trade-name bank was WingspanBank.com, launched as an operating unit of Bank One
Corporation in mid-1999 but absorbed back into the main bank in June 2001.
6. See ‘‘Net Survivors: Conservative Strategy Is Key,’’ American Banker (November 13,
2001): 1.
7. See ‘‘Would-Be Web Banks Call FDIC Too Slow,’’ American Banker (February 21,
2001): 1; and ‘‘OTS Finding Web Banks a Regulatory Handful,’’ American Banker (September
21, 2000):1.
8. See ‘‘AfterNextBank,Doubts on Internet-OnlyModel,’’AmericanBanker (February 11,
2002): 1; and ‘‘Would-Be Web Banks Call FDIC Too Slow,’’ American Banker (February 21,
2001): 1.
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could impose indirect costs on the second generation of Internet-only
banks by reducing their opportunities for spillover learning.
III. Relevant Literature
The theoretical framework introduced in this article, as well as the
empirical testing of that framework, rests on the findings of previous
research in three areas: experience effects, bank scale economies, and
Internet bank performance. The literature in each of these areas is briefly
reviewed here.
A. Learning and Experience Effects
Research on learning by doing began with a peculiarity observed in the
airframe manufacturing industry at the close of the Second World War.
British-manufactured airframes and U.S.-manufactured airframes were
of comparable quality, but U.S. companies could produce airframes more
quickly or at less expense than the British companies. Asher (1956),
Arrow (1962), Alchian (1963), Hartley and Corcoran (1978), and others
developed the idea of experience effects to explain this difference in
performance. The concept is often expressed as follows: holding produc-
tion technology and firm size constant, unit costs fall as a firm accumulates
experience using the technology. Based on information from 97 firms in
a variety of industries, Ghemawat (1985) found that a doubling of ex-
perience was typically associated with between a 10%–25% decline in
unit costs, where ‘‘experience’’ is defined as a 100% increase in accu-
mulated production between two points in time.
However, as pointed out by Griliches (1979), using accumulated
production to measure a firm’s stock of experience or knowledge can be
problematic, in part because firms gain knowledge not just from their
own investment and production activities but also via spillover effects
from competitors, suppliers, customers, universities, or government.
This point argues for an experience measure that is broader than accu-
mulated production; this study uses accumulated time as a proxy for a
bank’s stock of experience.
Experience effects have not been extensively measured in bank-
ing.9 However, a handful of studies—Rose and Savage (1984), Huyser
(1986), Hunter and Srinivasan (1990), Brislin and Santomero (1991),
DeYoung and Hasan (1998)—measured the rates at which the financial
performance of de novo banks improves over time. For example, the last
study estimated a ‘‘profitability time path’’ for de novo banks and found
9. One study, by Remolona and Wulfekuhler (1992), argued that finance companies that
entered certain niche markets (e.g., leasing) earlier that their bank competitors benefited from
‘‘dynamic scale economies in information because of their early entry and accumulated ex-
perience’’ (p. 25). These authors did not explicitly measure a learning or experience curve.
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that the typical 1990s de novo bank took about 9 years to become as
profitable as an established bank, with over half of this improvement
occurring during the initial 3 years of operation.10
B. Bank Scale Economies
The literature on commercial bank scale economies has been surveyed a
number of times elsewhere (e.g., Gilbert 1984; Clark 1988; Humphrey
1990; Evanoff and Israilevich 1991; Berger, Hunter, and Timme 1993;
Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan 1999). This literature evolved over time,
and the current debate focuses on whether the very largest banks enjoy
increasing returns to scale. Empirical research that uses standard tech-
niques finds that scale economies are limited, with estimates of minimum
efficient scale ranging between $10 billion and $25 billion. But a new
strain of the literature argues that standard approaches do not properly
account in the production function for the interplay between bank capital,
bank risk levels, and managerial preferences (Hughes et al. 2001), and
empirical models that attempt to account for these phenomena find that
scale economies exist for even the largest banks. Although this new
empirical approach has not been widely adopted, the results that it gen-
erates have some currency because they are consistent with the bank
megamergers that continue to occur in the United States and Europe.
This banking scale economy ‘‘controversy’’ is a moot point for
this study, because newly chartered banks fall well short of minimum
efficient scale by any measure. A more germane question is whether
the Internet-only business model gives banks access to deeper scale
economies than the traditional branching model. There has not yet been
a study of scale economies at Internet banks, but there is evidence
of larger than average scale economies at banks that use technology-
intensive production processes. Rossi (1998) found that mortgage banks
(which rely heavily on automated lending technologies) have access
to much larger scale economies than full-service commercial banks.
Similarly, the recent consolidation of the credit card banking sector into
a handful of very large competitors (again, banks that rely on automated
lending technologies) also suggests the existence of deep scale econo-
mies for technology-intensive banks.
C. Internet Banking
The diffusion rate of Internet Web sites in the banking industry has been
rapid. The first Internet bankingWeb sites were not launched until 1995,
10. Regulatory economists have focused on the age of new banks, rather than their
accumulated output, because like most business startups, newly chartered banks can be
financially fragile. Government supervisors responsible for detecting early signs of financial
problems can gain insight from studying the progress of young banks as they evolve over
time into mature banks.
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but nearly half of U.S. banks and thrifts were allowing customers to
perform banking transactions over the Internet by 2002.11 Two studies
have attempted to identify the conditions that cause banks to adopt this
technology. Furst, Lang, and Nolle (2002) found that a national bank in
1998 was more likely to offer Internet banking if it was large, well-run
(high return-on-equity, low noninterest expenses, good supervisory exam
ratings), located in an urban area, an affiliate in a bank holding company,
incurred high amounts of branch network expenses, and generated large
amounts of noninterest income. Courchane, Nickerson, and Sullivan
(2002) derived two testable implications from a theoretic model: firms
are more likely to be early adopters of new technology when they are
strategically large relative to their rivals and when uncertainty about de-
mand for the services produced with the new technology is low. They
explored the data for banks in the Tenth Federal Reserve District in 2000
and found significant empirical support for these theoretical implications.
Three previous studies examined the financial performance of Inter-
net banks. The first two studies employed a broad definition of Internet
bank that includes both click-and-mortar banks and Internet-only banks.
Sullivan (2000) found that Internet banks in the Tenth Federal Reserve
District incurred somewhat higher expenses but generated somewhat
higher fee income and concluded that ‘‘in general banks have been
neither helped nor harmed by their early commitment to the Internet as a
delivery channel’’ (p. 12). In contrast, Furst et al. (2002) studied the
profitability (return on equity) of national banks in 1999 and found that
Internet banks tended to outperform non-Internet banks on average.
However, both studies found that de novo Internet banks earned lower
profits than non-Internet de novo banks. The third study examined the
financial performance of six Internet-only banks and thrifts. Consistent
with the de novo bank results of the other two studies, DeYoung (2001)
found that the average Internet-only bank (which was only about 1 year
old) earned significantly lower profits than the average 1-year-old branch-
ing bank, due primarily to low business volumes and high noninterest
expenses.
IV. Experience Effects and Scale Effects
This article proposes and tests for the existence of four separate but
simultaneous performance processes at newly chartered Internet-only
banks. This framework generalizes to any industry in which new firms
11. In 1995, Wells-Fargo became the first bank to give its customers online access to
account statements, and Security First Network Bank became the first Internet-only bank. ( In
1998, the Royal Bank of Canada acquired and recapitalized Security First, but the Internet-
only strategy was retained. In August 2001, Security First was dismantled and its trans-
actions accounts were sold to Centura Bank, a brick-and-mortar subsidiary of Royal Bank.)
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enter the market using a production technology or business plan that is
distinctly different from that employed by incumbent firms. Banking
provides an especially appropriate test for this framework, because new
bank startups occur with regularity and a number of recent bank startups
have employed an innovative Internet-only business plan and produc-
tion technology.
The first two processes are common to all newly chartered banks,
regardless of their business models (Internet-only, click and mortar, or
brick and mortar). As discussed earlier, previous research established
that newly chartered banks substantially underperform established banks
at first, but these performance gaps systematically diminish over time
as new banks grow older and larger. General experience effects occur as
a new bank ages and, by doing so, accumulates general banking expe-
rience and knowledge of the local market. As this general experience
accumulates, it is transformed into improved financial performance
through learning-based improvements in pricing, marketing, cost con-
trol, risk management, employee relations, competitive strategy, and the
like. General scale effects occur as a new bank grows larger. Increased
size is transformed into improved financial performance primarily through
lower per-unit costs, although increased size can also produce revenue
efficiencies, as a new bank gains access to new product markets (e.g.,
middle-market lending or loan participation). Because age and size are
positively correlated at young banks, experience effects and scale effects
are unavoidably intertwined. In this study, ‘‘experience’’ is measured
indirectly by a bank’s age, holding bank size constant in multiple re-
gression tests.
The second two processes occur only at startup banks with busi-
ness models based on new or nontraditional technologies: in this study,
newly chartered Internet-only banks. Technology-based experience ef-
fects occur as a new Internet-only bank ages and its managers, employ-
ees, and perhaps even its customers accumulate experience with the new
technology. As with the general experience effect, the accumulation of
technology-based experience can get transformed into improved finan-
cial performance through any number of bank behaviors. If technology-
based experience effects exist, they are additive to general experience
effects; that is, a new Internet-only bank consumes them over and above
the experience effects to which all new banks have access. Similarly,
Internet-only banks may experience technology-based scale effects that
are additive to general scale effects. Web-based applications are often
said to be ‘‘scalable,’’ which narrowly defined refers to constant returns
to scale, that is, adding an additional server to a network of computers
does not induce diminishing returns (increased per-unit costs). How-
ever, given their similarities to financial institutions like mortgage banks
and credit card banks that achieve high volumes and low unit costs
by using automated production, marketing, and distribution techniques
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(online price discovery and loan applications, credit scoring models to
evaluate risk, loan securitization to manage risk, automated billing for
loan servicing), it seems plausible that Internet-only banks could exhibit
deeper scale economies than traditional branching banks.
If only the general experience and general scale effects exist in
meaningful magnitudes, then the financial performance of Internet-only
startups and traditional branching startups improve at similar rates as
these banks grow andmature. However, if technology-based experience
or technology-based scale effects exist in meaningful magnitudes, then
the financial performance of new Internet-only banks improve more
quickly than new traditional banks. The latter scenario is illustrated in
figure 1, where accumulated time (bank age) on the horizontal axis in-
directly measures accumulated experience, and return on assets (ROA)
on the vertical axis measures bank financial performance. Previous re-
search finds that traditional de novo banks (thin solid line) initially un-
derperform established banks (horizontal solid line) but gradually catch
up over time. Holding bank size constant, the rate at which the ROA-gap
AB diminishes is driven by general experience effects. (If a similar fig-
ure were drawnwith assets on the horizontal axis, the closing of the ROA-
gap AB could be attributed to general scale effects.) Previous research
also finds that Internet-only de novo banks initially underperform tra-
ditional de novo banks, but little is known about whether and how the
ROA-gapBC behaves over time. The dashed line running through pointC
is just one of many possible ROA time paths for Internet-only banks. It
characterizes the financial performance of Internet-only startups improving
Fig. 1.—Hypothetical time paths for return-on-assets (ROA) at newly chartered
banks.The thick solid line represents a performance benchmark, the average ROA
for small established banks. The thin solid line is a time path for ROA at newly
chartered branching banks, shaped like those found in previous empirical studies
(e.g., DeYoung 1999). The dashed line is a hypothetical time path for ROA at newly
chartered Internet-only banks.
902 Journal of Business
over time and eventually catching upwith traditional bank startups, with
the diminishing ROA-gap BC driven by technology-based experience
effects.12 (If a similar figure were drawn with assets on the horizontal
axis, the closing of the ROA-gap BC could be attributed to technology-
based scale effects.)
The regression analysis that follows tests for the existence of gen-
eral and technology-based experience and scale effects, estimates their
magnitudes, and identifies the aspects of financial performance through
which these effects are most-strongly manifested. Each of the import-
ant parameters in figure 1 is estimated, including the static performance
difference between Internet-only startups and branching startups (i.e.,
the performance gap BC ), the slope of the performance time path for
branching banks (i.e., general experience effects), the slope of the per-
formance path with respect to the size of branching banks (i.e., general
scale effects), changes in the performance gap BC as banks grow older
(i.e., the relative slopes of the two performance time paths or technology-
based experience effects), and changes in the performance gap BC as
banks grow larger (i.e., technology-based scale effects).
The conventional measure of experience used in the learning-by-
doing literature is accumulated production. However, this is a problem-
atic measure at banks that are, by definition, multiple-output firms.13
This study uses accumulated time (i.e., bank age) as a proxy for expe-
rience. This is a good proxy if the firms being compared are approxi-
mately equal in size, so that elapsed time provides a good approximation
of output-based experience. In the United States, newly chartered banks
12. If the two ROA time paths in figure 1 are viewed as streams of expected future re-
turns from an initial investment at t = 0, then the net present value of an Internet-only bank
startup would be less than the net present value of a traditional bank startup (assuming equal
risk). In such a world, rational investors would not start up Internet-only banks; however,
an Internet-only bank that had already started once the information in figure 1 became known
might continue to operate, depending on the liquidation values of the assets already in place
relative to the cash flows going forward. There are plausible ROA time paths different from
those shown in figure 1 that have different implications for future investments in new Internet-
only banks. (For example, the net present values of the two investments at t = 0 might be
identical if the Internet-only ROApath reached the traditional de novo bankROA level by, say,
year 2 and reached the mature bank benchmark ROA by, say, year 4.) In addition, if a second
generation of Internet bankers benefits from learning spillovers based on the experiences of the
first generation of Internet bankers, the time path for the second generation could arguably start
out with a higher ROA at t = 0 or have a steeper slope.
13. Asset-based production measures omit transactions-based services produced for de-
positors, omit fee-based services that do not appear on the balance sheet (e.g., credit en-
hancements, trust services, mutual fund sales), and entangle experience effects with scale
effects. Deposit-based production measures omit credit-based services produced for bor-
rowers, omit fee-based services, and entangle experience effects with financing decisions.
Flow-based production measures ( like the number of payments transactions or the number of
loan accounts) are preferable, but banking databases do not systematically record these
numbers and, in any event, aggregating flow measures across different product lines is
problematic.
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tend to be similar in size due to safety and soundness regulations.14
Minimum absolute levels of startup capital are necessary to qualify for
a bank charter, which sets a lower limit on startup size, and stringent
capital-to-assets requirements for young banks place a brake on asset
growth. Nevertheless, an asset-size control variable is included in all the
regressions in which age-based experience effects are estimated.
V. The Data
The key to evaluating the Internet-only banking model is to compare the
performance of the banks that use it (which, by definition, are new bank
startups) to the performance of new bank startups that use the more tra-
ditional branch-based bankingmodel. The Internet-only sample consists
of 12 banks and thrifts newly chartered in the United States between
1997 and 2000 whose primary point of customer contact is a transactional
Web site. The benchmark performance sample consists of 644 banks and
thrifts newly chartered in the United States between 1997 and 2000whose
primary point of customer contact is a physical branch. Both samples are
quarterly data panels that include multiple observations of each bank as
it ages.
To be included in the Internet-only sample, banks and thrifts had
to meet six conditions. These conditions ensure that the firms in the
Internet-only sample are ‘‘typical new bank startups’’ in every way ex-
cept that they produce, market, and distribute their financial services over
the Web rather than through physical branches; in other words, impos-
ing these conditions ensures that the tests that compare the financial per-
formance of these two sets of banks produce valid statistical inferences.
First, the firm had to be a separately chartered bank or thrift (i.e., not a
‘‘trade name’’) regarded by its primary regulator to be operating pri-
marily through the Internet. Twenty-three such institutions were oper-
ating in the United States at the end of the sample period (2001:Q2).
Second, the firm had to start its life by obtaining a new bank or thrift
charter from a state or federal regulator or by purchasing an existing bank
or thrift charter and relaunching the firm as an entirely new institution.15
14. U.S. commercial banks at least 10 years old ranged from $10 million to $500 billion in
assets in 2000. The quartiles (i.e., the 25th , 50th, and 75th percentiles) of the commercial bank
asset size distribution were $40 million, $80 million, and $190 million, respectively. By
comparison, the asset-size distribution of newly chartered banks was relatively homogeneous.
For example, urban banks and thrifts chartered in the initial year of this study (1997) ranged in
size from $2million to $225 million in assets 90-180 days after they opened, and the asset size
quartiles were $12 million, $17 million, and $24 million.
15. Charter conversions were allowed into the data set only when all the following events
occurred at relaunch: all preexisting branch operations were shut down; all the bank’s assets,
loans, and deposits fell dramatically; the bank received a substantial injection of equity
capital from its new owners; and the bank’s earnings were negative in its first full quarter of
operations (as is typical of a new bank startup).
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Third, the new firm had to offer a full range of basic banking services
over the Internet, including taking insured deposits, offering checking
accounts, and making loans.16 Fourth, banking had to be the principal
activity of the new firm, not just an ancillary activity.17 Fifth, the new
firm had to have less than $300 million in assets at the end of its first
full quarter of operation.18 Finally, the firm had to be operating for at
least two full quarters as of the end of the sample period. The 12 Internet-
only banks and thrifts that met these conditions are listed in table 1.19
The benchmark sample includes newly chartered banks and thrifts
that also met the conditions listed earlier, with the exception that they
were regarded by their primary regulators as operating primarily through
physical branches. In addition, the benchmark sample is limited to banks
that started up between the beginning of 1997 and the end of 2000 (the
time period over which the 12 Internet-only banks entered the market)
and were located in urban markets (this excludes rural banks that rely
heavily on agricultural loans, a line of business not engaged in by
Internet-only banks). Although the benchmark sample contains primarily
16. This condition excludes so-called Internet banks that actually rely quite heavily on
physical branch locations. For example, this condition rules out hybrid banks that gather
deposits through their Web sites but make loans at physical branches (e.g., Landmark Bank,
a.k.a. Giantbank.com), as well as those that make loans through their Web site but gather de-
posits at physical branches (e.g., Indy Mac Bank). This condition also excludes banks that
gather deposits at far-flung networks of Internet kiosks located at grocery stores or other retail
establishments, and invest those funds in securities or upstream them to their parent holding
companies rather than using them tomake loans (e.g., CIBCNational Bank, a.k.a.,MarketPlace
Bank). Finally, this condition excludes credit card Internet banks (e.g., NextBank, the banking
subsidiary of NextCard, which failed in February 2002) that use very little deposit funding.
17. For example, the online banking services provided by the Internet-only bank BMW
Bank of North America are ancillary to the sales of automobiles at BMW dealerships, and the
online banking services provided by E*Trade Bank are marketed primarily to the online
brokerage clients of its parent company E*Trade. Imposing this condition ensures that the
banks in the Internet-only sample focus on traditional banking markets and identify traditional
banks (such as those in the benchmark sample) as their main competitive rivals, rather than
commercial firms or nonbank financial firms.
18. Banks that are exceptionally large when they start up are likely to be ‘‘learning’’ (based
on their larger size and larger production throughput) at a pace well in excess of the typical
startup bank, so including such banks in the Internet-only sample wouldmake it difficult to test
for technology-based experience effects. This condition also excludes banks that were set up
using assets and asset relationships transferred from existing firms and, as such, are not truly
startup ventures. For example, BMW Bank started up with $500 million in automobile loans,
and E*Trade Bank started out with $3 billion of preexisting loans from its nonbranching
predecessor Telebank. Although $300 million in assets is an arbitrary cutoff, all the banks
excluded by this condition from the Internet-only sample also failed to meet at least one of
the other five conditions.
19. The 11 (out of 23) firms that did not qualify for the Internet-only sample were excluded
for one or more of the following reasons: 2 firms started with converted charters but retained
assets and relationships developed during the previous banking regime, 8 firms either did not
offer a full range of banking services over the Internet or relied heavily on physical channels
(e.g., kiosks, loan development offices, or ‘‘narrow branches’’ that accepted deposits but did
not market loans) to supplement their Internet channel, 3 firms started up with assets in excess
of $300 million, banking was an ancillary rather than the primary activity at 2 firms, and 1 firm
had not yet been operating for two full quarters.
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* Indicates banks included in the ‘‘survivor’’ data set.y Security First was originally started as an Internet-only bank using a new thrift charter in 1995. It subsequently was purchased by Royal Bank of Canada in late 1998,




























new brick-and-mortar banks, it unavoidably includes some click-and-
mortar bank startups that operate both physical branches and transactional
Web sites. Unfortunately, regulatory databases do not include the infor-
mation necessary to systematically identify which branching banks have
adopted Web sites, at what date they did so, and what percentage of their
activity is run through theirWeb sites versus their branches. If technology-
based experience effects and technology-based scale effects exist, they
will likely occur with lower intensity at new click-and-mortar banks
(which run only a portion of their activities through their Web sites) than
at new Internet-only banks (which run 100% of their activities through
theirWeb sites). To the degree that the benchmark sample contains some
new click-and-mortar banks, it will be more difficult to reject null hy-
potheses regarding the existence of technology-based experience effects
and technology-based scale effects at the new Internet-only banks.
The combined data set is an unbalanced panel of 4,742 quarterly
observations of 656 banks and thrifts observed over a 17-quarter window
from 1997:Q2 through 2001:Q2. Startup quarters are excluded from the
data, because banks typically operate for less than 90 days during their
startup quarters; thus, the sample period begins in the second quarter of
1997. Bank age (AGE) is set equal to 1 at the end of each bank’s first full
quarter of operations. The data panel is unbalanced for three reasons. First,
the newly chartered institutions started upat different times. Second, a very
small number of the institutions in the benchmark sample were acquired
during the sample period.20 Third, because high numerical values of AGE
are observed only for banks chartered near the beginning of the sample
period, while low numerical values of AGE are observed for all banks,
banks are included in the sample only up to their tenth full quarter of ope-
ration.21 This prevents the estimated slopes of the performance time paths
(see fig. 1) from being unduly influenced by a few older, outlying banks.
The sample period ends with the second quarter of 2001, because 3 of
the 12 banks in the Internet-only sample banks ceased to exist as Internet-
only banks shortly after that quarter.A fourth abandoned the Internet-only
strategy in late 2000. These four banks exited the business model in a
variety of ways—one was acquired by a brick-and-mortar bank, one
liquidated itself voluntarily, and two continued to operate after switching
to click-and-mortar business models—but all four were solvent at the
time they exited. Note that none of the banks in either sample failed dur-
ing the sample period and, as mentioned earlier, only a handful of banks
in the benchmark sample exited via merger during the sample period.
20. State laws restricting the acquisition of newly chartered banks account for the small
number of exits by acquisition. As of the mid-1990s, 30 of the 50 states had some legal
prohibition on the acquisition of de novo banks, ranging from between 3 years and 7 years
after these banks were launched. See Amel (1993).
21. For example, just four of the Internet-only banks had reached AGE = 10 by the end of
the sample period (2001:Q2).
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Nevertheless, to address the potential for survivor bias among the Internet-
only sample, all regression tests are performed for the full data set, which
includes all 12 Internet-only banks, and again for a ‘‘survivor’’ data set,
which excludes the four Internet-only banks in question. The full data
set regressions estimate the performance of the average Internet-only
bank or thrift, while the regressions using the survivor data set come
closer to estimating the ‘‘best practices’’ performance possibilities of
the Internet-only strategy.
VI. Initial Analysis of the Data
Table 2 presents means, standard deviations, and definitions for the
variables used in the regression tests, based on panels of quarterly data
from 1997:Q2 through 2001:Q2. The first 18 rows contain financial per-
formance ratios used as endogenous variables in the regressions, and
remaining rows contain exogenous regression variables as well as
some additional descriptive variables. The statistics displayed in col-
umn 1 describe the population of small, established banks and thrifts
(assets less than $1 billion and at least 10 years old) in urban U.S. mar-
kets during the sample period. Although the data in column 1 are not
used in the regression tests, they are useful for comparative purposes:
statistically significant differences between themeans of the newly char-
tered benchmark banks in column 2 and the small established banks
in column 1 provide evidence of the performance gap AB illustrated in
figure 1. Similarly, significant differences between the means of the
newly chartered Internet-only banks in column 3 and the newly char-
tered benchmark bank in column 2 provide evidence of the perfor-
mance gap BC. Finally, significant differences between the means of the
‘‘surviving’’ Internet-only banks in column 4 and the benchmark banks
in column 2 suggest that performance gaps like BC even for the better-
run Internet-only banks. All the difference of means tests in table 2 con-
trol for the fact that banks are observed multiple times in each panel data
set.22
A. Branching Startups (Col. 2) Relative to Small Established Banks (Col. 1)
Consistent with earlier studies, the financial performance of newly char-
tered branching banks was substantially worse on average than the
22. The difference of means tests are generated from random effects regressions that pool
the quarterly data from the two columns being compared. These regressions are specified as
Xit ¼ aþ b Dit þ ui þ eit ,where Xit is the variable being tested,Di is a dummy equal to 1 for
banks in the second of the two pooled samples, ui is a random disturbance specific to each bank
and constant across time, and eit is a random disturbance term with mean zero. The estimated
magnitude of b provides the test of economic significance (note that this estimate is usually
very similar to the simple difference between the two means being compared) and the sta-
tistical difference of b from zero provides the test of statistical significance.
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TABLE 2 Summary Statistics for Quarterly Data, 1997:Q2–2001:Q2
[1] Established Banks
(N ¼ 48;146;K ¼ 3;777)
[2] Benchmark Banks
(N ¼ 4;667;K ¼ 644)
[3] Internet-Only Banks
(N ¼ 75;K ¼ 12)
[4] Internet-Only Banks,
Survivor Sample
(N ¼ 49;K ¼ 8)
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Performance Ratios:
ROA .0109 .0098 .0134*** .0269 .0431*** .0469 0.0240 .0347
ROE .1187 .0967 .0467*** .1234 .1842*** .2014 0.1111*** .1599
SPREAD .0548 .0140 .0424*** .0163 .0178*** .0178 .0125*** .0170
LOANRATE .0906 .0115 .0807*** .0159 .0629*** .0181 .0586*** .0174
DEPRATE .0358 .0081 .0383*** .0101 .0451*** .0123 .0461*** .0121
LOANS .6141 .1460 .5740*** .1927 .4718* .2574 .5594 .2511
DEPOSITS .8450 .0843 .7750*** .1301 .6958* .1620 .7124 .1739
FEES .0108 .0157 .0071*** .0169 .0035 .0035 .0031 .0036
NIEXP .0349 .0193 .0520*** .0323 .0801*** .0663 .0530 .0461
LABOREXP .0181 .0096 .0259*** .0161 .0293 .0253 .0219 .0250
FTES .0004 .0002 .0005*** .0003 .0004 .0003 .0003** .0003
WAGE ($1,000) $43.54 $13.41 $54.87*** $16.83 $73.05*** $19.56 $70.90*** $15.17
PREMEXP .0053 .0031 .0085*** .0060 .0134*** .0130 .0089 .0107
OTHEREXP .0029 .0029 .0044*** .0042 .0091*** .0094 .0055 .0048
OVERHEAD .0198 .0133 .0356*** .0300 .0213 .0245 .0143 .0238
EQUITY .0979 .0408 .1909*** .1232 .2329 .1549 .2144 .1575
GROWTH .0426 .3927 .5339*** .8371 1.0539*** 1.5525 1.2357*** 1.7416

















AGE (quarters) 244.24 150.58 4.81*** 2.75 4.29 2.72 4.37 2.83
ASSETS ($1,000) $192,039 $193,254 $48,668*** $48,610 $221,661*** $256,278 $251,724*** $297,884
%REALESTATE .6580 .1918 .6245*** .2100 .7511** .2210 .8130*** .1768
%BUSINESS .1994 .1475 .2744*** .1803 .0654*** .0941 .0415*** .0582
%CONSUMER .1284 .1217 .0890*** .1148 .1408 .1552 .0927 .1086
%CREDITCARD .0053 .0136 .0048** .0164 .0427*** .0652 .0140 .0227
ALLOWANCE .0080 .0045 .0065*** .0035 .0033*** .0032 .0042** .0033
MBHC .2413 .4279 .1727*** .3780 .0533 .2262 .0000 .0000
THRIFT .1152 .3193 .0812** .2732 .6267*** .4869 .6122*** .4923
OCC .2657 .4417 .2008*** .4006 .0667 .2511 .0000 .0000
JOBGROWTH .0055 .0039 .0052*** .0043 .0180*** .0076 .0186*** .0076
Note.—Definitions: ROA= return on assets (annualized). ROE = return on book equity (annualized). SPREAD = LOANRATE minus DEPRATE. LOANRATE = interest and fees
received on loans divided by total loans (annualized). DEPRATE = interest paid on deposits divided by total deposits (annualized). LOANS= total loans divided by total assets.
DEPOSITS = total deposits divided by total assets. FEES= noninterest income divided by total assets (annualized). NIEXP = total noninterest expense divided by total assets
(annualized). LABOREXP= salary and benefits expense divided by total assets (annualized). FTES = number of full-time-equivalent employees divided by total assets.WAGE = salary
and benefits expense divided by FTES (annualized). PREMEXP = expense on premises and equipment divided by total assets (annualized). OTHEREXP = all ‘‘other’’ (i.e., nonlabor
and nonpremises) noninterest expenses divided by total assets (annualized). OVERHEAD = book value of physical assets divided by total assets. EQUITY = book value of equity
divided by total assets. GROWTH = asset growth rate (annualized). BADLOANS= nonperforming loans divided by total assets. AGE = number of full calendar quarters since the
bank’s ledger was opened. ASSETS = total assets. %REALESTATE = real estate loans divided by total loans. %BUSINESS = commercial and industrial loans divided by total loans.
%CONSUMER = consumer loans divided by total loans. %CREDITCARDS = credit card loans divided by total loans. ALLOWANCE = allowance for loan and lease losses divided by
total assets. MBHC = 1 if bank is an affiliate in a multibank holding company; = 0 otherwise. OCC = 1 if bank holds a national bank charter; = 0 otherwise. THRIFT = 1 if bank holds a
thrift charter; = 0 otherwise. JOBGROWTH = growth rate of total employment in the bank’s home state (annualized).
N refers to the number of quarterly observations, and K refers to the number of banks. The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate that the mean value in question is significantly
different from the mean value in one of the other columns (col. 2 means are compared to col. 1 means, col. 3 means are compared to col. 2 means, and col. 4 means are also compared to
col. 2 means) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The significance tests are generated from random effects regressions that pool the quarterly data from the two columns being compared.
The regressions are specified as Xit ¼ aþ b Dit þ ui þ eit , where Xit is the variable being tested, Di is a dummy equal to 1 for banks in the second of the two pooled samples, ui is a
random disturbance specific to each bank and constant across time, and eit is a random disturbance termwith mean zero. The statistical significance of the estimate for b provides the test.
All variables are in 2000 dollars. Financial ratios that are based on quarterly flows have been converted to annualized values. All variables were truncated at the .005 and .995 percentiles




























financial performance of small established banks. On average, return
on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) at the branching startups
fell short of established bank levels by more than 200 basis points and
700 basis points, respectively. This is strong evidence of a negative fi-
nancial performance gap between new branching banks and small es-
tablished banks, consistent with line segment AB in figure 1.
Nearly all aspects of branching startup performance contributed
to these earnings gaps. Interest margins (SPREAD) averaged 124 basis
points lower, due to both lower interest rates charged to borrowers
(LOANRATE) and higher interest rates paid to depositors (DEPRATE).
The branching startups had difficulty generating business volume, as
evidenced by lower levels of loans to assets (LOANS), deposits to as-
sets (DEPOSITS), and noninterest income to assets (FEES). The ratio
of noninterest expenses to assets (NIEXP) was 171 basis points higher
than at the small established banks, and all three components of non-
interest expenses were significantly higher as well: labor expenses to
assets (LABOREXP), premises expenses to assets (PREMEXP), and
‘‘other’’ noninterest expenses to assets (OTHEREXP). The higher labor
expenses were driven both by higher average wage levels (WAGE) and
higher levels of full-time employees to assets (FTES). It is important to
note, however, that high levels of noninterest costs at newly chartered
banks are more likely to indicate initial excess capacity rather than man-
agerial inefficiency, as evidenced by the high ratio of physical plant to
assets (OVERHEAD).
Three performance ratios were better at the newly chartered branch-
ing banks than at the small established banks. Equity capital to assets
(EQUITY) was twice as large; these capital cushions are crucial to fuel
the fast asset growth rates (GROWTH) and absorb the negative earn-
ings typical of new bank startups. Finally, the ratio of nonperforming
loans to total loans (BADLOANS) was near zero for the startups be-
cause new banks typically hold portfolios of new, unseasoned credits.
By definition, branching startup banks were considerably younger
(AGE) and smaller (ASSETS) than small established banks. The startup
banks’ loan portfolios were more heavily weighted toward commercial
loans (%BUSINESS) and less heavily weighted toward real estate loans
(%REALESTATE), consumer loans (%CONSUMER), and credit card
loans (%CREDITCARD), reflecting the small business orientation of
many newly chartered banks.23 The low level of loan loss reserves to
assets (ALLOWANCE) for the startup banks is consistent with their low
levels of nonperforming loans. Compared to small established banks,
the startup banks were more likely to hold state bank charters (i.e., less
likely to hold national bank charters [OCC] or thrift charters [THRIFT])
23. DeYoung, Goldberg, and White (1999) find that this focus on small business lending
diminishes over time and is virtually absent by the time a bank becomes 20 years old.
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and less likely to be affiliates inmultibank holding companies (MBHC).
Economic conditions, measured by the quarterly state employment growth
rate (JOBGROWTH), were weaker in the states in which the new branch-
ing banks started up, although this difference was not economically
significant.
B. Internet-Only Startups (Col. 3) Relative to Branching Startups (Col. 2)
Profitability at the typical Internet-only startup bank was lower than
the already poor profitability at the typical branching startup bank; on
average, ROA and ROE were about 300 and 1,400 basis points lower,
respectively. These negative performance gaps are consistent with line
segment BC in figure 1. A closer look at the components of profitability
indicates that these banks successfully applied some elements of the
Internet-only business model, such as low interest margins and fast asset
growth, but did not successfully apply other elements of the model, such
as low overhead ratios.
Interest margins at Internet-only start-ups were about 250 basis points
lower than at branching startups, due to both lower loan interest rates
(178 basis points) and higher deposit interest rates (68 basis points).
But, despite offering more attractive prices, the Internet-only startups
generated fewer loans (LOANS was about 10 percentage points lower)
and attracted fewer deposits (DEPOSITS was about 8 percentage points
lower) than the branching startups.24 The composition of the loan port-
folio at the average Internet-only startup was also substantially dif-
ferent, heavy on the transactions loans (%REALESTATE was about
13 percentage points higher, %CONSUMER was about 5 percentage
points higher, and %CREDITCARD was about 4 percentage points
higher) and light on the relationship loans (%BUSINESS was about
21 percentage points lower) relative to the average branching startup.
The low levels of loan generation, deposit generation, and relationship
loans are all consistent with the arm’s-length nature of banking without
branch offices.Mortgages, auto loans, credit cards, and other transactions
loans can be underwritten using automated underwriting techniques eas-
ily deployed over the Internet, but relationship lending to small busi-
nesses requires person-to-person contact. On the positive side, these data
suggest that Internet-only startups may have access to larger scale econ-
omies than branching startups, because transactions lending techniques
have low ratios of variable costs to fixed costs.
Because there is no good single measure of ‘‘bank overhead,’’ testing
whether Internet-only banks operate with less overhead than branching
banks must consider a variety of different financial ratios, including
24. These loan rate and deposit rate comparisons do not control for differences in port-
folio composition or risk levels across the two sets of banks. Controls for these phenomena
are included in the regression tests.
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NIEXP, PREMEXP, OTHEREXP, OVERHEAD, and FTES.25 The over-
all evidence suggests that overhead spending is no lower at Internet-only
banks. Total noninterest expense ratios were higher by 281 basis points,
driven primarily by expenses on physical premises (about one-and-a-half
times higher than at the branching startups) and expenses on ‘‘other’’
noninterest items (about twice as high as at the branching startups). The
latter category includes items on which Internet-only banks may be es-
pecially dependent, such as contracts with venders to service and main-
tain the Web site, payments to ATM networks that provide liquidity
services to Internet-only bank customers, and perhaps most important
marketing expenditures: branching banks receive ‘‘free’’ advertising
whenever a potential customer walks or drives past a bank branch, but
Internet-only banks that exist only in cyberspace have to purchase ad-
vertising to attract new customers to the Web site.26 The significant dif-
ference of means for WAGE provides another example of the different
mixes of inputs required by these two groups of banks: the average
Internet-only bank paid $18,000 more in salary and benefits per worker
per year, suggesting that this business model requires a more highly
skilled workforce.
The average Internet-only startup was about 45 days younger than
the average branching startup, but it was four times larger—a direct
result of 100% faster annual asset growth. Rapid growth is easier for
transactions-based lenders (e.g., home mortgages) that need not build
relationships with their customers; moreover, the low default rates as-
sociated with portfolios dominated by homemortgage loans allows these
banks to hold significantly lower reserves for bad loans. Internet-only
banks serve a nationwide market, so JOBGROWTH was set equal to
the national employment growth rate for these banks. Therefore, the
JOBGROWTH data are consistent with two possibilities: the Internet-
only observations come disproportionately from quarters in which the
national economy was performing relatively well or the branching banks
tended to start up in states with below-average rates of employment
growth.
These data indicate that the financial performance of the typical
Internet-only startup fell short of the typical branching startup and that
25. Among the reasons making it difficult to measure relative expenditures on bank
overhead are these: Some banks purchase office space (which gets capitalized and then de-
preciated) while other banks rent it (which gets directly expensed), but depreciation on plant
and equipment is not reported as a separate expense line in bank regulatory financial databases.
26. Although regulatory financial data do not systematically break down ‘‘other noninterest
expenses’’ into subcategories, secondary records for commercial banks suggest that marketing
expenditures constitute a substantial portion of these expenses. (These secondary data are not
collected from thrifts.) For the final full year in the data, 60% (three out of five) of the Internet-
only commercial bank startups reported that expenditures on ‘‘marketing,’’ ‘‘advertising,’’ or
promotions accounted for at least 10% of their ‘‘other noninterest expenses.’’ This contrasts
with 31% (or 167 out of 533) of the branching commercial bank startups.
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the Internet-only banking model has not performed as originally ex-
pected. But these univariate comparisons only offer preliminary evi-
dence. A more thorough investigation asks two additional questions:
(1) Can some subset of well-managed banks make the Internet-only
model work more profitably? (2) Does increased experience or in-
creased scale materially improve the performance of the Internet-only
model? The remainder of Section VI addresses these two questions
using simple univariate and bivariate analyses. Sections VII and VIII
address these two questions using a more elegant multivariate regres-
sion framework.
C. ‘‘Surviving’’ Internet-Only Startups (Col. 4) Relative to Branching
Startups (Col. 2)
The results so far indicate that the average Internet-only startup per-
formed poorly relative to the average branching bank startup. But this
evidence does not necessarily constitute an indictment of the Internet-
only business strategy, rather, it may be that this innovative business
model is difficult for the average banker to execute effectively. A better
test of the viability of the Internet-only banking model is whether some
banks (as opposed to the average bank) have been able to successfully
operationalize this strategy. One might argue that the eight Internet-
only startup banks in the ‘‘survivor’’ sample—that is, startup banks that
were still actively pursuing the Internet-only strategy at the close of the
sample period—have been better able to operationalize this business
strategy.
Indeed, the ROA performance gap for the eight surviving Internet-
only banks was not statistically different from zero, and the ROE per-
formance gap for these banks was relatively small at just 644 basis
points. Greater output generation (LOANS and DEPOSITS) accounts
for some of this improved performance, but most of it appears to have
resulted from basic cost control. Each of the three major categories of
noninterest expenses (LABOREXP, PREMEXP, OTHEREXP) was
comparable to expense levels at the branching startup banks. Among
the indicators of overhead spending, PREMEXP was economically and
statistically similar to the branching startup banks, OVERHEAD was
economically but not statistically lower than at the branching startups,
and FTES was economically and statistically lower than at the branch-
ing startups.
These data suggest that banks that implement each of the primary
elements of the Internet-only business model early in their lives (lower
overhead, more attractive prices, and faster growth), and manage to
keep their expenses down, have been more successful. However, these
relatively successful Internet-only startups still earned lower returns on
equity than the average branching startup bank. Does this profitability
gap disappear as well-managed Internet-only banks grow older and gain
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experience with the new business model? As they grow larger and
capture potential scale economies?
D. Preliminary Evidence of Experience Effects and Scale Effects
Figure 2 maps out ROA time paths for the full 12-bank Internet-only
sample and for the 8-bank Internet-only survivor sample. The figure
also includes two performance benchmarks: the ROA time path for the
branching start-up banks and the average level of ROA for the small
established banks. All the performance time paths plot the median
(annualized) ROA in each quarter for the banks in question. Consistent
with the data in table 2, the Internet-only time path lies below the branch-
ing bank time path, with the time path for the Internet-only survivors in
between. Consistent with the stylized figure 1, the Internet-only time paths
have steeper slopes than the branching bank time path, crude evidence
of technology-based experience effects. For the Internet-only survivors,
the ROA performance gap diminishes from about 200 basis points for
1-quarter-old banks to about 100 basis points for 5-quarter-old banks
and finally to less than 50 basis points for 7- to 10-quarter-old banks.
Figure 3 similarly maps out ROA size paths, where bank size is mea-
sured discretely along the horizontal axis in nine asset size categories.27
These performance size paths exhibit the same relative ordering as the
ROA time paths in figure 2. The ROA for Internet-only banks is well
Fig. 2.—Time paths for return on assets (ROA). Quarterly data are drawn from
1997:Q2–2001:Q2 and annualized. The thick solid line is the median ROA for
small established banks over 1997:Q2–2001:Q2. The thin solid line is the median
quarterly ROA for the newly chartered branching bank sample. The dashed line
with diamonds is the median quarterly ROA for the newly chartered Internet-only
survivor bank sample. The dashed line without diamonds is the median quarterly
ROA for the newly chartered Internet-only bank sample.
27. The break points between the nine asset size categories are $25 million, $50 million,
$75 million, $100 million, $150 million, $200 million, $250 million, and $300 million.
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below that for branching banks for the smallest banks (by about 1,000
basis points in the smallest size category), but this performance gap
diminishes for larger banks and is virtually nonexistent for the Internet-
only survivors in the largest size category. Thus, the figure provides crude
evidence of technology-based scale effects. The patterns in figures 2 and
3 are similar because de novo bank age and de novo bank size are closely
related (the linear correlation betweenAGE andASSETS is a statistically
significant 0.549 for the Internet-only banks), and thismakes it difficult to
know whether technology-based scale effects, technology-based expe-
rience effects, or both are responsible for the diminishing ROA perfor-
mance gaps. The multiple regression tests presented and estimated in the
next two sections attempt to identify and discern between these two per-
formance processes.
VII. Regression Framework
Two types of regressions tests are performed here. A static regression
analysis tests for the existence and magnitude of cross-sectional finan-
cial performance gaps between the Internet-only startup banks and the
branching startup banks, controlling for bank age, bank size, and other
exogenous influences on bank performance. Equations (1) and (2) spe-
cify the static regression tests. A dynamic regression analysis tests for
the existence of general and technology-based experience and scale
Fig. 3.—Size paths for return on assets (ROA). Quarterly data are drawn from
1997:Q2–2001:Q2 and annualized. The break points between the nine asset size
categories are and $25 million, and $50 million, and $75 million, and $100 million,
and $150 million, and $200 million, and $250 million, and and $300 million. The
thick solid line is the median ROA for small established banks over 1997:Q2–
2001:Q2. The thin solid line is the median quarterly ROA for the newly chartered
branching bank sample. The dashed line with diamonds is the median quarterly
ROA for the newly chartered Internet-only survivor bank sample. The dashed line
without diamonds is the median quarterly ROA for the newly chartered Internet-
only bank sample.
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effects, again controlling for exogenous influences on bank perfor-
mance. Equation (3) specifies the dynamic regression tests. The regres-
sions use pooled data sets that combine the Internet-only startup samples
with the branching bank startup sample, and are estimated using both
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation techniques and restricted max-
imum likelihood (REML) estimation techniques with random effects.
Equation (1) is specified as follows:
PERFORMANCE i; t ¼ aþ b  INTERNETi
þ d  lnAGE i; t þ l  lnASSETS i; t
þ u1  %BUSINESS i; t þ u2  %REALESTATE i; t
þ u3 LOANSi; t þ u4 ALLOWANCE i; t
þ u5 MBHC i þ u6 THRIFTi þ u7 OCCi þ u8  JOBGROWTH i; t
þ u9 YEAR t þ u10 QUARTERt þ "i; t; ð1Þ
where PERFORMANCE can be any one of the 18 financial performance
ratios displayed in the top panel in table 2. The subscript i indexes bank-level
observations, and the subscript t indexes time in quarters. INTERNET is a
dummy variable equal to 1 for Internet-only startup banks, and the coeffi-
cient b provides the main static test. A statistically significant value for b
indicates a financial performance gap between the Internet-only startups and
the branching bank startups at the means of the data.
In these static regression tests, both AGE and ASSETS are charac-
terized as control variables. The natural log of AGE is included to control
for the effects of accumulated production experience on bank perfor-
mance, and the natural log of ASSETS is included to control for the ef-
fects of operating scale on bank performance.28 The terms %BUSINESS
and %REALESTATE are included to control for the effects of loan
portfolio mix on bank input requirements, bank earnings, bank growth
rates, and other bank performancemeasures. LOANS andALLOWANCE
are standard measures of bank riskiness.29MBHC, THRIFT, and OCC are
dummy variables equal to 1 for banks that, respectively, are affiliates in
multibank holding companies, hold thrift charters, and hold national bank
charters. JOBGROWTH is included to control for economic conditions in
the home state of bank i during quarter t. (The nationwide quarterly av-
erage is assigned to the Internet-only banks.) YEAR and QUARTER are
28. AGE is specified in natural logs because previous research (as well as the crude time
paths displayed in figure 2) found that most measures of de novo bank financial performance
approach established bank levels at a decreasing rate over time (e.g., DeYoung 1999).
ASSETS is specified in natural logs because marginal gains from scale economies tend to
decrease with bank size.
29. LOANS is excluded from the regressions in which it is the dependent performance
variable.
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dummy variables that control for cyclical and seasonal influences on bank
performance not captured by the other control variables. The structure of
the disturbance term "i, t depends onwhetherOLS orREML techniques are
used to estimate the regression equations (details later).
Given the small number of banks in the Internet-only sample, the
estimates of b in equation (1) could be influenced by outlying obser-
vations. To account for this possibility, equation (2) replaces the sin-
gle Internet-only term with a vector of individual Internet-only bank
dummies as follows:
PERFORMANCE i; t ¼ aþ
P12
j¼1
bj  INTERNETi j
þ d  lnAGE i; t þ l  lnASSETSi; t
þ u1 %BUSINESS i; t þ u2 %REALESTATE i; t
þ u3 LOANSi; t þ u4 ALLOWANCE i; t
þ u5 MBHCi þ u6 THRIFTi þ u7 OCCi þ u8  JOBGROWTH i; t
þ u9 YEAR t þ u10 QUARTERt þ "i; t; ð2Þ
which essentially provides an individual intercept shift for each of the 12
Internet-only banks. The aggregate number of positive and negative bj
coefficients in equation (2) serves as a check on whether the results for b in
equation (1) are systematic. Both parametric and nonparametric tests of
significance are used to make this determination.
Equations (1) and (2) assume away technology-based experience ef-
fects and technology-based scale effects because they restrict the Internet-
only banks to follow the same performance time path (d * lnAGE) and the
same performance size path (l * lnASSETS) as the branching banks.
Equation (3) allows for dynamic tests of Internet-only bank performance
by relaxing these restrictions:
PERFORMANCE i; t ¼ aþ b  INTERNETi
þ d  lnAGE i; t þ l  lnASSETS i; t
þ g  INTERNETi  lnAGE i; t þ h  INTERNETi  lnASSETS i; t
þ u1 %BUSINESS i; t þ u2 %REALESTATE i; t
þ u3 LOANS i; t þ u4 ALLOWANCE i; t
þ u5 MBHCi þ u6 THRIFTi þ u7 OCCi þ u8  JOBGROWTH i; t
þ u9 YEAR t þ u10 QUARTERt þ "i; t: ð3Þ
The coefficients on lnAGE, INTERNET * lnAGE, lnASSETS, and
INTERNET * lnASSETS provide the main dynamic tests. The coefficient d
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gives the slope of the performance time path for branching startups (general
experience effects); the sum d + g gives the slope of the performance time
path for Internet-only startups (general experience effects plus technology-
based experience effects); and the magnitude and statistical significance of
g indicates the importance of any technology-based experience effects.
Similarly, the coefficient l gives the slope of the performance size path for
branching startups (general scale effects); the sum l + h gives the slope of
the performance size path for Internet-only startups (general scale effects
plus technology-based scale effects); and the magnitude and statistical
significance of h indicates the importance of any technology-based scale
effects. All these effects are estimated at the means of the data.
Empirically separating technology-based experience effects from
technology-based scale effects may be difficult, given the relatively
small number of observations for Internet-only startup banks as well as
the strong correlation between AGE and ASSETS for all newly char-
tered banks. Robustness tests of equation (3) that exclude either the
INTERNET * lnAGE term or the INTERNET * lnASSETS term are
performed to investigate the potential effects of colinearity on the pa-
rameter estimates.
As stated earlier, all the regressions are estimated using OLS and
REML techniques with random effects. The random effects approach
includes a bank-specific random disturbance term (in addition to the
usual random disturbance term) that accounts for unexplained variation
in the dependent variable that is specific to bank i during the sample pe-
riod. Because the true form of this bank-specific variation is unknown,
four alternative structures are used to model the variance-covariance
matrix, the details of which are presented in the appendix. Note that
a fixed effects estimation approach is not feasible here, because the
phenomena being tested for are themselves fixed effects. For example,
the coefficients bj in equation (2) are bank fixed effects. Furthermore,
much of the variation necessary to estimate the coefficients b, g, and h
in equations (1) and (3) would be soaked up in a bank fixed-effects
model.
VIII. Regression Results
Selected regression results for equations (1), (2), and (3) are displayed in
tables 3 through 6. These estimates reflect the financial performance of
the average new startup bank in the data, which was about 1H years old.
Because regression coefficients are estimated with error, the estimated
coefficients b1 through b12 in equation (2) are analyzed as a group and
not separately identified by the names of the 12 Internet-only startup
banks. Complete results for the ROA regressions are presented in the
appendix; complete results for the regressions using the other 17 de-
pendent variables are available on request from the author.
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Regressions Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Average
ROA Full .0399*** .0423*** .0468*** .0474*** .0293*** .0411
Survivors .0251*** .0312*** .0319*** .0339*** .0163*** .0277
ROE Full .1904*** .1960*** .1960*** .2004*** .1929*** .1951
Survivors .1317*** .1520*** .1321*** .1351*** .1299*** .1362
SPREAD Full .0187*** .0177*** .0162*** .0165*** .0169*** .0172
Survivors .0245*** .0230*** .0204*** .0214*** .0210*** .0221
DEPRATE Full .0079*** .0047** .0061*** .0057** .0058** .0060
Survivors .0068*** .0051* .0059** .0055** .0059** .0058
LOANRATE Full .0121*** .0124*** .0111*** .0112*** .0099*** .0113
Survivors .0177*** .0174*** .0160*** .0162*** .0145*** .0164
DEPOSITS Full .0854*** .1317*** .1474*** .1473*** .1667*** .1357
Survivors .0878*** .1357*** .1608*** .1637*** .1648*** .1426
LOANS Full .0699*** .0261 .0726 .0702 .0941** .0282
Survivors .0081 .0364 .1436*** .1410*** .1897*** .1005
FEES Full .0092*** .0051 .0057 .0058 .0027 .0057
Survivors .0098*** .0056 .0059 .0061 .0024 .0060
NIEXP Full .0336*** .0500*** .0576*** .0569*** .0370*** .0470
Survivors .0118*** .0363*** .0399*** .0420*** .0305*** .0321
PREMEXP Full .0067*** .0088*** .0091*** .0095*** .0091*** .0086
Survivors .0029*** .0068*** .0064*** .0073*** .0046*** .0056
LABOREXP Full .0084*** .0189*** .0212*** .0216*** .0143*** .0169
Survivors .0025 .0166*** .0179*** .0189*** .0109** 0.0134
OTHEREXP Full .0042*** .0048*** .0053*** .0051*** .0025*** .0044
Survivors .0015** .0026** .0027*** .0028** .0019** .0023
FTES Full .00007** .00025*** .00029*** .00028*** .00024*** 0.00023
Survivors .00000 .00024*** .00029*** .00029*** .00027** .00022
WAGE Full 8.9940*** 12.7257*** 12.3029*** 12.9293*** 12.3018*** 11.8507

































Regressions Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Average
GROWTH Full .3347*** .2464** .2984*** .2531 .0915 .2448
Survivors .6585*** .6858*** .6550*** .7835*** .5307** .6627
EQUITY Full .0840*** .1550*** .1828*** .1866*** .1468*** .1510
Survivors .0854*** .1652*** .2078*** .2212*** .1719*** .1703
OVERHEAD Full .00101 .01744** .02498*** .02556*** .02382*** .01856
Survivors .00240 .02010** .02810*** .02840*** .02900*** .02064
BADLOANS Full .0009 .0000 .0009 .0008 .0015 .0002
Survivors .0013 .0024 .0018 .0018 .0016 .0018
Note.—The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The average is the unweighted mean of the
















TABLE 4 Numbers of Positive and Negative Estimates of
P12
j¼1 Bj from 90 Regressions of Equation (2)
Random Effects Model
Dependent Variable Coefficient Signs OLS Regressions Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
ROA Positive and significant 0 0 0 0 0
Negative and significant 9 8 8 8 6
Most frequent sign 12 negative*** 12 negative*** 12 negative*** 12 negative*** 11 negative***
ROE Positive and significant 0 0 0 0 0
Negative and significant 9 8 8 7 7
Most frequent sign 12 negative*** 11 negative*** 12 negative*** 12 negative*** 12 negative***
SPREAD Positive and significant 0 0 0 0 0
Negative and significant 10 3 3 3 5
Most frequent sign 11 negative*** 11 negative*** 11 negative*** 11 negative*** 10 negative***
DEPRATE Positive and significant 7 2 2 2 2
Negative and significant 0 0 0 0 1
Most frequent sign 10 positive*** 8 positive* 10 positive*** 10 positive*** 10 positive***
LOANRATE Positive and significant 0 0 0 0 0
Negative and significant 7 4 4 4 4
Most frequent sign 10 negative*** 9 negative*** 9 negative*** 9 negative*** 10 negative***
DEPOSITS Positive and significant 1 0 0 0 0
Negative and significant 7 3 3 5 6
Most frequent sign 10 negative*** 10 negative*** 10 negative*** 10 negative*** 10 negative***
LOANS Positive and significant 3 1 2 2 4
Negative and significant 5 3 1 1 2
Most frequent sign 7 negative 7 negative 8 positive* 8 positive* 9 positive**
FEES Positive and significant 0 0 0 0 0
Negative and significant 4 0 0 0 0




























TABLE 4 (Continued )
Random Effects Model
Dependent Variable Coefficient Signs (no.) OLS Regressions Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
NIEXP Positive and significant 6 6 8 8 7
Negative and significant 1 0 0 0 0
Most frequent sign 9 positive*** 11 positive*** 11 positive*** 11 positive*** 10 positive***
PREMEXP Positive and significant 5 3 5 5 3
Negative and significant 1 0 0 0 0
Most frequent sign 10 positive*** 10 positive*** 10 positive*** 10 positive*** 10 positive***
LABOREXP Positive and significant 4 4 3 3 2
Negative and significant 1 0 0 0 0
Most frequent sign 7 positive 11 positive*** 11 positive*** 11 positive*** 10 positive***
OTHEREXP Positive and significant 5 4 4 4 3
Negative and significant 0 0 0 0 0
Most frequent sign 8 positive* 11 positive*** 10 positive*** 10 positive*** 9 positive**
FTES Positive and significant 3 2 4 4 2
Negative and significant 1 0 0 0 0

















Dependent Variable Coefficient Signs (no.) OLS Regressions Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
WAGE Positive and significant 6 2 2 2 2
Negative and significant 0 0 0 0 0
Most frequent sign 8 positive* 9 positive** 8 positive* 9 positive** 8 positive*
GROWTH Positive and significant 4 4 4 3 2
Negative and significant 2 3 3 3 1
Most frequent sign 6 positive 6 positive 6 positive 6 positive 7 negative
EQUITY Positive and significant 6 6 6 5 4
Negative and significant 2 0 0 0 0
Most frequent sign 9 positive** 10 positive*** 10 positive*** 11 positive*** 10 positive***
OVERHEAD Positive and significant 2 2 2 4 3
Negative and significant 3 0 0 0 0
Most frequent sign 7 negative 8 positive* 9 positive** 9 positive** 11 positive***
BADLOANS Positive and significant 1 1 1 1 0
Negative and significant 1 0 0 0 0
Most frequent sign 7 negative 9 negative** 8 negative* 8 negative* 11 negative***
Note.—Superscripts ***, **, and * indicate that the probability of observing this many positive or negative coefficients (out of 12) is at most 1%, 5%, or 10%, respectively,




























TABLE 5 Estimated Coefficients for the Terms D * lnAGEi,t (General Experience Effects), J * lnASSETSi,t (General Scale Effects),
E * INTERNETi * lnAGEi,t (Technology-Based Experience Effects), and F * INTERNETi * lnASSETSi,t
(Technology-Based Scale Effects) from 90 Regressions of Equation (3) for the Full Data Set
Random Effects Model
Dependent Variable OLS Regressions Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Average
ROA lnAGE .0139*** .0122*** .0147*** .0146*** .0159*** .0143
lnAGE * INB .0040 .0062 .0080 .0079 .0007 .0053
lnASSETS .0111*** .0160*** .0150*** .0160*** .0087*** .0134
lnASSETS * INB .0027 .0064 .0082* .0089* .0050 .0062
ROE lnAGE .0489*** .0447*** .0465*** .0470*** .0493*** .0473
lnAGE * INB .0268 .0141 .0068 .0118 .0120 .0143
lnASSETS .0419*** .0438*** .0414*** .0408*** .0382*** .0412
lnASSETS * INB .0462*** .0449** .0350 .0365 .0325 .0390
SPREAD lnAGE .0073*** .0082*** .0099*** .0093*** .0104*** .0090
lnAGE * INB .0020 .0022 .0000 .0004 .0002 .0000
lnASSETS .0022*** .0015** .0007 .0011 .0012* .0013
lnASSETS * INB .0007 .0009 .0011 .0020 .0004 .0007
DEPRATE lnAGE .0023*** .0037*** .0038*** .0040*** .0038*** .0035
lnAGE * INB .0023 .0041** .0008 .0000 .0002 .0001
lnASSETS .0011*** .0022*** .0007* .0002 .0000 .0006
lnASSETS * INB .0043*** .0018 .0062*** .0054*** .0050*** .0038
LOANRATE lnAGE .0096*** .0112*** 7.0117*** .0121*** .0120*** .0113
lnAGE * INB .0003 .0011 .0007 .0010 .0018 .0006
LnASSETS .0011*** .0002 .0007 .0003 .0013** .0006
lnASSETS * INB .0036** .0004 .0041 .0019 .0007 .0021
DEPOSITS lnAGE .0614*** .0528*** .0657*** .0660*** .0772*** .0646
lnAGE * INB .0697*** .0904*** .0090 .0020 .0398 .0262
lnASSETS .0511*** .1188*** .1201*** .1189*** .0794*** .0977
















TABLE 5 (Continued )
Random Effects Model
Dependent Variable OLS Regressions Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Average
LOANS lnAGE .0742*** .1034*** .1254*** .1254*** .1325*** .1122
lnAGE * INB .0012 .0459* .0672** .0679** .0531 .0466
lnASSETS .0176*** .0006 .0540*** .0539*** .0681*** .0318
lnASSETS * INB .0132 .0254 0.0613** 0.0613** .0161 .0355
FEES lnAGE .0009** .0008* .0009 .0009* .0012** .0009
lnAGE * INB .0004 .0012 .0007 .0001 .0011 .0004
lnASSETS .0009** .0001 .0001 .0003 0.0008* .0001
lnASSETS * INB .0017 .0006 .0018 .0011 .0009 .0006
NIEXP lnAGE .0089*** .0062*** .0085*** .0082*** .0091*** .0082
lnAGE * INB .0001 .0020 .0074 .0064 .0090 .0014
lnASSETS .0150*** .0287*** .0283*** .0297*** .0225*** .0248
lnASSETS * INB .0019 .0102** .0167** .0152** .0006 .0087
PREMEXP lnAGE .0008*** .0009*** .0012*** .0012*** .0013*** .0011
lnAGE * INB .0015 .0036*** .0011 .0015 .0014 .0012
lnASSETS .0033*** .0043*** .0044*** .0045*** .0035*** .0040
lnASSETS * INB .0033*** .0025** .0005 .0003 .0003 .0003
LABOREXP lnAGE .0052*** .0035*** .0043*** .0043*** .0046*** .0044
lnAGE * INB .0054* .0108*** .0027 .0027 .0050 .0053
lnASSETS .0078*** .0150*** .0154*** .0161*** .0121*** .0133
lnASSETS * INB .0049** .0110*** .0040 .0038 .0041 .0056
OTHEREXP lnAGE .0007*** .0005*** .0007*** .0006*** .0010*** .0007
lnAGE * INB .0016** .0040*** .0007 .0014 .0053*** .0026
lnASSETS .0010*** .0019*** .0016*** .0019*** .0011*** .0015
lnASSETS * INB .0001 .0011 .0015* .0008 .0018*** .0001
FTES lnAGE .0001*** .0000*** .0000*** .0000*** .0001*** .0001
lnAGE * INB .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0001 .0000
lnASSETS .0002*** .0003*** .0003*** .0003*** .0003*** .0003
lnASSETS * INB .0000 .0000 .0001* .0001* .0001** .0000
WAGE lnAGE 3.3409*** 2.6415*** 3.3820*** 2.9128*** 3.1837*** 3.0922
lnAGE * INB 6.9682** 11.8268*** 4.7604 7.2319** 10.6104*** 8.2795
lnASSETS 2.0892*** .4441 .7016 .4587 .1174 .3541




























TABLE 5 (Continued )
Random Effects Model
Dependent Variable OLS Regressions Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Average
GROWTH lnAGE .6916*** .6921*** .6952*** .6995*** .6187*** .6794
lnAGE * INB .0820 .2795 .1418 .2157 .2755 .1989
lnASSETS .0997*** .1241*** .1254*** .1468*** .1153*** .1223
lnASSETS * INB .3828*** .3695*** .3655*** .3680*** .2540** .3480
EQUITY lnAGE .0613*** .0467*** .0532*** .0517*** .0658*** .0558
lnAGE * INB .0875*** 0.0381** .0018 .0322** .1048*** .0026
lnASSETS .0673*** .1529*** .1765*** .1783*** .1080*** .1366
lnASSETS * INB .0319*** .0282** .0596*** .0954*** .1418*** .0586
OVERHEAD lnAGE .0014* .0015* .0019** .0021** .0001 .0008
lnAGE * INB .0118** .0060 .0096** .0092** .0155*** .0104
lnASSETS .0126*** .0190*** .0257*** .0272*** .0213*** .0212
lnASSETS * INB .0205*** .0193*** .0248*** .0247*** .0264*** .0231
BADLOANS lnAGE .0009*** .0005** .0004* .0004 0.0002 .0004
lnAGE * INB .0027** .0055*** .0033** .0035** .0011 .0032
lnASSETS .0003** .0009*** .0007*** .0007*** .0006*** .0007
lnASSETS * INB 0.0022** 0.0035*** 0.0026* 0.0026* 0.0011 0.0024
Note.—The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The average is the unweighted mean of the
















TABLE 6 Estimated Coefficients for the Terms D * lnAGEi,t (General Experience Effects), J * lnASSETSi,t (General Scale Effects),
E * INTERNETi * lnAGEi,t (Technology-Based Experience Effects), and F * INTERNETi * lnASSETSi,t
(Technology-Based Scale Effects) from 90 Regressions of Equation (3) for the Survivor Data Set
Random Effects Model
Dependent Variable OLS Regressions Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Average
ROA lnAGE .0140*** .0122*** .0148*** .0147*** .0154*** .0142
lnAGE * INB .0019 .0059 .0073 .0082 .0017 .0043
lnASS .0112*** .0160*** .0150*** .0159*** .0082*** .0133
lnASS * INB .0076** .0073 .0116** .0126** .0012 .0081
ROE lnAGE .0495*** .0449*** .0469*** .0473*** .0495*** .0476
lnAGE * INB .0335 .0236 .0111 .0164 .0174 .0204
lnASS .0421*** .0438*** .0415*** .0403*** .0379*** .0411
lnASS * INB .0168 .0443* .0171 .0256 .0247 .0257
SPREAD lnAGE .0072*** .0081*** .0099*** .0093*** .0104*** .0090
lnAGE * INB .0013 .0010 .0006 .0005 .0021 .0004
lnASS .0022*** .0015** .0007 .0011 .0012* .0013
lnASS * INB .0019 .0014 .0008 .0004 .0032 .0014
DEPRATE lnAGE .0023*** .0038*** .0038*** .0041*** .0038*** .0035
lnAGE * INB .0041** .0014 .0041 .0030 .0037 .0027
lnASS .0012*** .0022*** .0007** .0002 .0000 .0006
lnASS * INB .0044*** .0007 .0071*** .0064*** .0058*** .0046
LOANRATE lnAGE .0095*** .0111*** .0116*** .0120*** .0120*** .0112
lnAGE * INB .0028 .0010 .0042 .0021 .0046 .0029
lnASS .0011*** .0002 .0007 .0003 .0013** .0006
lnASS * INB .0063*** .0024 .0068** .0046 .0059* .0052
DEPOSITS lnAGE .0612*** .0528*** .0665*** .0667*** .0780*** .0650
lnAGE * INB .0677*** .0637** .0332 .0439* .0799** .0051
lnASS .0511*** .1197*** .1208*** .1197*** .0787*** .0980




























TABLE 6 (Continued )
Random Effects Model
Dependent Variable OLS Regressions Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Average
LOANS lnAGE .0745*** .1039*** .1255*** .1253*** .1323*** .1123
lnAGE * INB .0302 .0962*** .1406*** .1420*** .1207*** .1059
lnASS .0174*** .0005 .0536*** .0533*** .0673*** .0315
lnASS * INB .0444 .0554** .0889*** .0903*** .0483 .0655
FEES lnAGE .0009** .0008* .0009 .0009* .0012** .0010
lnAGE * INB .0003 .0013 .0000 .0002 .0013 .0006
lnASS .0009** .0001 .0001 .0003 0.0008* .0001
lnASS * INB 0.0010 .0009 .0008 .0005 .0015 .0000
NIEXP lnAGE .0092*** .0062*** .0085*** .0084*** .0088*** .0082
lnAGE * INB .0011 .0151** .0061 .0102 .0004 .0066
lnASS .0151*** .0288*** .0282*** .0283***  .0226*** .0246
lnASS * INB .0136*** .0191*** .0201*** .0217*** .0016 .0152
PREMEXP lnAGE .0008*** .0008*** .0012*** .0011*** .0014*** .0011
lnAGE * INB .0035*** .0016 .0002 .0008 .0007 .0003
lnASS .0033*** .0042*** .0043*** .0045*** .0032*** .0039
lnASS * INB .0009 .0017 .0001 .0007 .0002 .0003
LABOREXP lnAGE .0052*** .0034*** .0043*** .0043*** .0047*** .0044
lnAGE * INB .0023 .0086** .0000 .0001 .0003 .0021
lnASS .0078*** .0150*** .0155*** .0161*** .0115*** .0132
lnASS * INB .0089*** .0104*** .0041 .0039 .0002 .0055
OTHEREXP lnAGE .0008*** .0005*** .0008*** .0007*** .0009*** .0007
lnAGE * INB .0006 .0001 .0014 .0018 .0007 .0006
lnASS .0010*** .0019*** .0016*** .0019*** .0012*** .0015
lnASS * INB .0014** .0017** .0026*** .0027*** .0001 .0017
FTES lnAGE .0001*** .0000*** .0000*** .0000*** .0001*** .0001
lnAGE * INB .0000 .0001* .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
lnASS .0002*** .0003*** .0003*** .0003*** .0003*** .0003

















Dependent Variable OLS Regressions Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Average
WAGE lnAGE 3.2998*** 2.5543*** 3.3503*** 2.8867*** 3.1921*** 3.0566
lnAGE * INB 5.9155 4.5379 1.1522 .6207 1.6751 2.7803
lnASS 2.0871*** .4388 .6726 .4489 .0241 .3792
lnASS * INB 4.7040* 3.1572 1.2002 .5116 .1160 1.8914
GROWTH lnAGE .2241*** .2051*** .2422*** .4447*** .3436*** .2919
lnAGE * INB .2311 .2700 .2260 .3340** .2772** .2677
lnASS .0221 .0222 0254 .0698*** .0819*** .0443
lnASS * INB .3665*** .3631*** .3582*** .2101** .3272*** .3250
EQUITY lnAGE .0612*** .0464*** .0538*** .0525*** .0669*** .0562
lnAGE * INB .1020*** .0584*** .0202 .0741*** .1085*** .0085
lnASS .0674*** .1539*** .1779*** .1797*** .1092*** .1376
lnASS * INB .0376*** .0172 .0665*** .1125*** .1386*** .0594
OVERHEAD lnAGE .0015** .0015* .0020** .0022*** .0001 .0008
lnAGE * INB .0161** .0061 .0085* .0080 .0088 .0095
lnASS .0126*** .0190*** .0258*** .0273*** .0214*** .0212
lnASS * INB .0189*** .0194*** .0267*** .0275*** .0230*** .0231
BADLOANS lnAGE .0009*** .0005** .0004* .0003 .0002 .0004
lnAGE * INB .0007 .0016 .0007 .0009 .0003 .0008
lnASS .0003** .0009*** .0007*** .0007*** .0006*** .0006
lnASS * INB .0009 .0012 .0013 .0013 .0011 .0012
Note.—The superscripts ***, **, and * indicate the coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The Average is the unweighted mean of the




























A. Static Tests of Performance
Table 3 displays the estimated values of b from 180 regressions of
equation (1). These regressions used 18 dependent variables (listed in
the first column of table 3), two Internet-only banking data samples (the
full sample of 12 banks and the survivor sample of 8 banks), and five
estimation procedures (OLS and four random effects approaches).30 For
convenience, the last column in table 3 displays the simple average for
the five estimated values of b in each row. The estimates of b are rela-
tively robust to the choice of an estimation technique. In only a few
cases (LOANS, FEES, OVERHEAD) did the sign or statistical signif-
icance of the OLS b vary systematically from the sign or statistical sig-
nificance of the random effects values of b, although the OLS estimates
of b tended to be smaller in absolute magnitude.
The signs of the estimated b values in table 3 are largely consistent
with the performance gaps inferred by the difference of means tests in
table 2; however, the performance gaps inferred by the regressions are
more often statistically significant and have different magnitudes, be-
cause they are conditioned on the exogenous regression variables. On
average, across the five estimation techniques, profitability was substan-
tially lower at the Internet-only startups than at the branching startups,
by 411 basis points of ROA and by 1,951 basis points of ROE. This
profitability gap was driven by deficiencies in a number of performance
areas. Interest spreads were lower on average by 172 basis points (about
two-thirds due to lower loan interest rates and about one-third due to
higher deposit interest rates). Noninterest expenses to assets was 470
basis points higher than at the average branching startup, with labor
expenses accounting for the largest portion of this cost disadvantage.
The average Internet-only bank paid an estimated $12,000 more in
annual salaries and benefits per employee than the average branching
bank and hired an estimated 50 more full-time-equivalent employees
(.23 employees per million dollars of assets times $220 million in
assets). On the plus side, the average Internet-only startup grew about
24 percentage points faster than the average branching startup, and its
equity-to-assets ratio was about 15 percentage points higher, almost
exactly offsetting its 13.5 percentage point financing shortfall in
30. To conserve space, goodness-of-fit measures are not reported in tables 3 through 6. The
statistical fit of the 450 regression equations reported in these tables vary substantially depending
on which of the 18 performance variables is used on the left-hand-side of the regression. For
example, in the OLS estimations of eq. (1) for the full data set, the three highest adjusted R2
statistics were .5426 for EQUITY, .4481 for ROA, and .4444 for LOAN, while the three lowest
adjusted R2 statistics were .0523 for GROWTH, .0653 for FEES, and .0693 forWAGE. In 14 of
these 18 cases, the adjusted R2 statistics exceeded .1500, and in 11 of these 18 cases the adjusted
R2 statistics exceeded .2500. In general, adjusted R2 were slightly larger in the more-flexibly
specified eqq. (2) and (3). Although the random effects estimations do not generate a goodness-
of-fit statistic directly comparable to adjusted R2s, the likelihood ratios in these regressions
suggest ranges and patterns of statistical fit similar to the OLS regressions.
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deposits to assets. No systematically significant performance gaps were
associated with nonperforming loans, noninterest income, loans to
assets, or physical overhead.
For the Internet-only banks in the survivor data set, these perfor-
mance gaps tended to be smaller, but they remained statistically sig-
nificant. For example, the profitability performance gaps averaged just
277 basis points of ROA and 1,362 basis points of ROE for the eight
survivor Internet-only banks. This superior financial performance was
driven mostly by lower noninterest expenses and, to some extent, larger
loan balances and more rapid asset growth.
Table 4 summarizes the signs and statistical significance of the esti-
mated vectors of bj coefficients from 90 regressions of equation (2).
These results demonstrate that the estimated performance gaps reported
in table 3 for the average Internet-only startup are not being driven by a
few poorly performing outliers. Consistent with the equation (1) results,
negative bj coefficients are significantly more prevalent (based on non-
parametric tests) than positive bj coefficients for ROA, ROE, LOANRATE,
DEPOSITS, and SPREAD, and positive bj coefficients are significantly
more prevalent than negative b j coefficients for EQUITY, DEPRATE,
NIEXP, PREMEXP, LABOREXP, OTHEREXP, WAGE, and FTES.
Moreover, the nonparametric tests indicate two additional negative per-
formance gaps where none existed in table 3: the Internet-only startups
were significantly more likely to have lower noninterest income (FEES)
and fewer nonperforming loans (BADLOANS) than the average branch-
ing startups. The results suggest that only one of the results from equa-
tion (1) was driven by outliers: There is no evidence in table 4 that the
growth rates (GROWTH) of the Internet-only startups differed system-
atically from the growth rates of the branching startup banks.
B. Dynamic Tests of Performance
Tables 5and 6 display the regression coefficients from the key terms in
eq. (3): d * lnAGEi,t (general experience effects), l * lnASSETSi,t (gen-
eral scale effects), g * INTERNETi * lnAGEi,t (technology-based ex-
perience effects), and h * INTERNETi * lnASSETSi,t (technology-based
scale effects). Table 5 displays estimates from 90 regressions using the
full Internet-only sample, and table 6 displays estimates from 90 regres-
sions using the survivor sample.
The results indicate that Internet-only startups have access to sig-
nificant technology-based scale economies, over and above the signif-
icant general scale economies available to all startup banks. As a result,
the financial performance gaps at the Internet-only startup banks tended
to narrow as these banks grew larger—in terms of figure 3, the size
performance paths are steeper for the Internet-only startups than the
branching bank startups. These effects were concentrated in just a few
aspects of financial performance, most notably in noninterest expenses.
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Despite plentiful evidence of general experience effects for startup
banks, the results contain little systematic evidence of technology-based
learning or experience effects.
General experience effects. There is strong evidence of general experi-
ence effects in the data. BothROA (average d = .0143) andROE (average d =
.0473) increase over time as the average startup bank ages, gradually re-
ducing the profitability gap between startup banks and small established
banks.Most of the underlying components of bank profits also exhibit gen-
eral experience effects. All three categories of bank production (LOANS,
DEPOSITS,andFEES) increasewithbankage,whileall sixof thevariables
associated with noninterest expenses (NIEXP, PREMEXP, OTHEREXP,
LABOREXP,WAGE,andFTES)declinewithbankage.Althoughbothde-
posit interest rates and loan interest rates increase as new banks age, their
combined effect results in a larger interest rate spread. The initially high
capital cushions at startup banks are consumed over time by negative earn-
ings and rapid asset growth, although newbanks’ tremendous rates of asset
growthslowdownsomewhatastheygrowolder.Theseresultsareconsistent
withthehypothesis thatstartupbanks(regardlessofbusinessmodel) learnto
more-efficiently control expenses, manage interest rates, and market their
products and services as theyaccumulate experienceover time,holdingbank
size constant.
General Scale Effects. Even though bank age and bank size are strongly
correlated at startup banks (as discussed), the regressions tend to generate
statistically significant coefficients onboth thegeneral experience effect term
d * lnAGEi,t and the general scale effect terml * lnASSETSi,t . Thus, general
scale effects operate separately and independently from general experience
effects at newly chartered banks. Both ROA (average l = .0134) and ROE
(average l = .0412) increase with the asset size of the startup banks. Five of
the six noninterest expensemeasures (all butWAGE) andOVERHEADde-
cline as startup banks grow larger, consistentwith spreadingfixed and semi-
variable expenses over greater amounts of output. The results suggest that
these cost savings may allow larger startup banks to cut their interest
margins (SPREAD)without sacrificing earnings. Similarly, because a larger
bank can better diversify its investments, increased sizemay allow startup
banks to economize on expensive equity capital (EQUITY) despite expe-
riencing higher ex post credit risk (BADLOANS).Asset growth and deposit
generation also are positively associated with startup bank size. These
results are consistent with the hypothesis that increased size gives startup
banks (regardless of business model) access to (mainly cost-related) scale
economies, holding bank age constant.
Technology-Based Experience Effects. There is little evidence of tech-
nology-based experience effects in the data. The coefficient g on the term
INTERNETi * lnAGEi,t is not statistically different from zero in any of
the ROA and ROE regressions reported in tables 5 and 6. This suggests that
the profitability of Internet-only startup banks and branching startup banks
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improved at the same rate as these banks aged and gained experience.
Still, some areas of financial performance (LOANS, OTHEREXP, and
OVERHEAD) exhibit statistically significant and relatively systematic
‘‘learning curves’’ in table 5. For example, the LOANS experience effect
equals 0.1122 * lnAGE for the average branching bank startup (i.e., a
doubling of AGE results in a 7.77 percentage point increase in loans to
assets) but equals 0.1122 * lnAGE + 0.0466 * lnAGE for the average
Internet-only startup (i.e., a doubling of AGE results in an 11.01 percentage
point increase in loans to assets).31This suggests that startup banks using the
Internet-only technology experience steeper learning curves for loan gen-
eration than startup banks that use more traditional technologies.
As discussed earlier, the small number of Internet-only observations
(N = 75) and the strong correlation between AGE andASSETS at young
banks may make the estimation of technology-specific experience
effects difficult. To test whether these phenomena mask the existence of
technology-based experience effects, equation (3) was reestimated after
dropping the scale interaction term h * INTERNETi * lnASSETSi,t.
However, the results of these regressions were qualitatively similar to
those reported in tables 5 and 6 for the full equation (3) specification.
Technology-based scale effects. There issomewhatstrongerevidenceof
technology-based scale effects in the data, especially among the ‘‘survivor’’
Internet-only startups,which arguably are better-managed firms. The coef-
ficient h on the term INTERNETi * lnASSETSi,t is positive in all 10 ROA
regressions and statistically significant in 5 of these regressions, including
3 of the 5 survivor bank regressions in table 6.32 On average, a doubling
of asset size is associated with a 148 basis point increase in ROA at survi-
vor Internet-only startups, compared to only a 92 basis point increase at
branching bank startups. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis
that banks using the Internet-only technology have access to deeper scale
economies.
Note, however, that there is no similar evidence of technology-
based scale effects in the ROE regressions; for example, the model 1
regressions in both tables 5 and 6 suggest that ROE remains flat as
Internet-only banks grow larger. The link between ROA and ROE is the
capital-to-asset ratio, and the EQUITY regressions confirm that this
ratio declined significantly slower at the Internet-only banks than at the
branching banks as banks grew their assets.33 These results are con-
sistent with the anecdotes reported in notes 6 and 7; based on this
combined evidence, one might conclude that more stringent capital
31. The math for the first of these two calculations is LOANS = .1122 ln(2AGE) =
.1122  ln2 + .1122  lnAGE = .0777 + .1122  lnAGE.
32. In addition, the estimated coefficient h = .0073 in the ROA random effects model 1 in
table 6 is statistically different from zero at the 11% level of significance.
33. Several of the Internet-only banks went back to the market to raise substantial
amounts of additional equity capital during their second year of operation.
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regulation for Internet-only bank startups has suppressed returns to
investors in those ventures.
The primary source of the technology-based scale gains in ROA
appears to be cost scale economies. On average, total noninterest
expenses (NIEXP) decline more quickly with asset size at the survivor
Internet-only startups (.0246 .0152) than at the branching bank
startups (.0246). A similar, although more modest, result obtains for
OTHEREXP. Both deposit rates and loan rates increase more quickly
with asset size at the Internet-only startups (by an average of .0046 and
.0052 basis points, respectively), but these two effects offset each other
in SPREAD. As Internet-only startups grow larger, they also growmore
slowly and generate relatively less output than comparable branching
bank startups (GROWTH, DEPOSITS, LOANS).34
IX. Conclusions
As the Internet becomes more important for commerce, Internet Web
sites become a more integral part of companies’ business plans. One
potential source of value in Internet-based business models comes from
automation and increased scale: because automated processes typically
require large fixed investments but reduce variable costs, e-commerce
applications may substantially reduce per-unit costs or increase the
optimal size of the firm. Another potential source of value in Internet-
based business models comes from learning: because e-commerce ap-
plications are often (if not typically) introduced by startup firms, simply
accumulating experience with a new business model can generate re-
ductions in per-unit costs and increases in per-unit revenues over time.
This article introduces a framework for considering the implications
of scale and learning at startup firms using nontraditional (e.g., Internet-
based) business models. The framework allows learning to improve the
performance of these firms in two ways: through general experience
effects, which are available to all firms regardless of the business model
they use, and technology-based experience effects, which are available
only to firms that use the nontraditional business model. Similarly, the
framework allows increased size to improve new firm performance in
two ways: through general scale effects, which are available to all firms
regardless of the business model they use, and technology-based scale
effects, which are available only to firms that use the nontraditional
business model. The banking industry, where startup firms are abundant
and a number of these startups recently introduced a nontraditional and
largely untried Internet-only business model, is a natural place to test for
these differential learning and scale effects.
34. Reestimating eq. (3) without the experience interaction term h * INTERNETi *
lnAGEi,t generated results that were qualitatively similar to those reported in tables 5 and 6.
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Anempirical analysis tests for the existence of these learning and scale
effects for a dozen new Internet-only banks and thrifts that started up in
the United States between 1997 and 2000, using 644 branching banks
and thrifts that started up during the same time period as a performance
benchmark. There is strong evidence of general experience effects avail-
able to all startups, but there is little evidence that technology-based
learning accelerates the financial performance of Internet-only startups.
On the other hand, there is evidence that increased scale yields a dif-
ferentially greater improvement in financial performance for Internet-
only startups relative to branching bank startups.35 These results are
robust across estimation techniques and stronger for banks with long-
term commitments to the Internet-only business model, and they also
tend to be associated with banks that exhibit strong cost control and
conservative growth behaviors.
To date, most Internet-only banks and thrifts have struggled for
profitability, and a substantial percentage of the firms that tried this
business model abandoned it. As a result, the Internet-only model, once
ballyhooed by banking pundits as the wave of the future, has lost favor
and is generally not considered to be a viable business strategy for
banking firms. To be sure, this study confirms the low average levels of
profits at Internet-only banks, but it also reveals that some features of
this business model have worked exactly as expected. For example, the
typical Internet-only startup offered customers better prices (lower
interest rates on loans and higher interest rates on deposits) than the
average branching bank startup and grew substantially faster as well.
However, reductions in overhead and other expenses have not materi-
alized as expected, and this has acted as a drag on profits.
Against this ambiguous backdrop, the study identifies two phenom-
ena that could improve the long-run odds for the Internet-only banking
model. First, the evidence is consistent with the existence of technology-
specific scale effects. As time passes and Internet-only banks grow
larger, the resulting scale efficiencies may be large enough to close the
remaining profitability gap with branching banks. This is an empirical
question, and at this point in time, the potential size of any scale savings
is unknown because most Internet-only banks are still relatively small.
Second, the evidence is consistent with anecdotal reports that capital
regulations have been administered more stringently with respect to
Internet-only banks, suppressing the rate of return to investors in these
ventures. As time passes and regulators gain experience and become
more comfortable with this business model, these extranormal capital
35. These findings are consistent with at least one consulting firm study, which concluded
that small size can be a deterrent to the successful application of Web-based banking
technologies. See ‘‘Internet Banking Profit Seen Harder for Small Banks,’’ American Banker
(November 3, 2000): 10.
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requirements could be relaxed, boosting returns and making the model
more attractive to investors. This is a regulatory question, and it is dif-
ficult to know regulatory policy behavior will change until more is known
about the risk profiles of Internet-only banks.
It is natural to wonder about the implications of these results for
banks that use the click-and mortar business model, by far the dominant
approach for Internet banking. Because click-and-mortar banks dis-
tribute some portion of their services over the Internet channel, they are
likely to benefit from the existence of technology-based scale effects, as
long as negative synergies from combining the branch and Web dis-
tribution channels are not large (e.g., migrating branch-based customers
to the Internet may require banks to operate some of their branches at
suboptimal scale). However, because click-and-mortar banks split their
business volume between the branch channel and the Internet channel,
they capture fewer technology-based scale economies than an Internet-
only bank with similar business volume. There is little reliable data on
how click-and-mortar banks split their business volume between these
two channels, so the relative scale efficiencies achievable with these two
different Internet banking strategies is unknown. As a (very crude) first
approximation, to capture the same amount of technology-based scale
savings as an Internet-only bank, one would expect that a click-and-
mortar bank that runs 25% of its volume through its Web site would
have to be four times as large as the Internet-only bank. Hence, click-
and-mortar banks likely benefit from the scale gains associated with
the Internet channel, but only to the extent that they can migrate their
branch-based customers to their Web site. And this is easier said than
done, because the value proposition that attracted branch-based retail
customers to these banks in the first place (i.e., a convenient physical
location and personalized service) can be easily destroyed if a bank
pushes customers to migrate too quickly.
Although this study concludes that the Internet-only banking model
is potentially viable under current conditions, this is no guarantee that
Internet-only banks will continue to exist in the future; and if they do
exist in the future, their market share is likely to be limited. Common
sense and casual empiricism suggest that an increasing portion of future
banking transactions will be conducted over the Internet, but they also
suggest the majority of these transactions will occur at click-and-mortar
banks. As the number of banks has declined in the United States, sur-
viving banks have competed vigorously by offering customers in-
creased choice and convenience, and the result has been an explosion
in the number of branch offices and automated teller machines.36
36. DeYoung and Hunter (2003) provide evidence on the increasing number of bank
branches, ATMs, and Internet Web sites between 1991 and 2000.
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Click-and-mortar banking is a logical continuation of this progression.
The share of the market captured by Internet-only banks ultimately de-
pends on the number of retail customers that do not value these choices.
Furthermore, the results generated here characterize the Internet-only
banking model as a high-volume, low-cost strategy for delivering basic
banking services, suggesting that Internet-only banks that serve this
customer niche will be relatively large operations.
Appendix
Random Effects Models
The regression equations (1), (2), and (3) are estimated using both ordinary least
squares estimation techniques and restricted maximum likelihood estimation tech-
niques with random effects. The OLS approach pools the time-series/cross-section
data, and assumes that the data are generated as follows:
yi; t ¼ aþ b
0
xi; t þ "i; t; ðA1Þ
where i indexes banks, t indexes time, y is the dependent variable, a is a constant
term to be estimated, x is a vector of exogenous variables, @ is a vector of coefficients
to be estimated, and " is a random disturbance term with mean zero and variance s2
that is normally and independently distributed across all i and t. Thus, the OLS
approach assumes that all observations t= 1,T for bank i are independent of each other.
In contrast, the random effects approaches assume that the data are generated as
follows:
yi; t ¼ aþ @
0
xi; t þ ui þ "i; t; ðA2Þ
where u is a group-specific (bank-specific) disturbance term that enters the re-
gression identically in each period for bank i. Because the true form of this
bank-specific variation is unknown, four random effects models, identified as
models 1 through 4 in the tables, are used in the regression analysis in tables 3
through 6.
Each of these models imposes a different structure on the variance-covariance
matrix. Assuming the maximum number of T = 10 observations for each bank,
random effects model 1 imposes the following ‘‘compound symmetry’’ structure
on the 10-by-10 portion of the variance-covariance matrix corresponding to bank i:
6ð1Þ ¼
s2 þ s1 s1 s1    s1
s1 s2 þ s1 s1    s1
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TABLE A1 Results for Equation (1) Using the Full Data Set,
with ROA the Dependent Variable
Random Effects Model
OLS Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept .1688*** .2125*** .2063*** .2176*** .1410***
(.0054) (.0087) (.0092) (.0097) (.0080)
INB .0399*** .0423*** .0468*** .0474*** .0293***
(.0028) (.0054) (.0051) (.0056) (.0043)
lnAGE .0138*** .0121*** .0145*** .0144*** .0158***
(.0006) (.0008) (.0008) (.0008) (.0009)
lnASSETS .0112*** .0163*** .0152*** .0163*** .0088***
(.0005) (.0008) (.0009) (.0009) (.0007)
QUARTER1 .0035*** .0052*** .0037*** .0041*** .0029***
(.0009) (.0008) (.0007) (.0007) (.0006)
QUARTER2 .0030*** .0037*** .0028*** .0031*** .0022***
(.0009) (.0007) (.0007) (.0006) (.0005)
QUARTER3 .0037*** .0039*** .0028*** .0032*** .0025***
(.0009) (.0007) (.0005) (.0005) (.0004)
YEAR98 .0024 .0009 .0037** .0038** .0052***
(.0018) (.0015) (.0017) (.0016) (.0019)
YEAR99 .0007 .0036** .0025 .0020 .0041*
(.0018) (.0017) (.0020) (.0020) (.0023)
YEAR00 .0006 .0049** .0024 .0012 .0035
(.0018) (.0021) (.0023) (.0024) (.0026)
YEAR01 .0015 .0097*** .0017 .0035 .0008
(.0020) (.0026) (.0027) (.0028) (.0029)
ALLOWANCE 1.4433*** 1.5164*** 2.2336*** 2.1514*** 1.7539***
(.1152) (.1427) (.1623) (.1588) (.1261)
LOANS .0337*** .0443*** .0344*** 0357*** .0287***
(.0021) (.0027) (.0029) (.0029) (.0025)
%REALESTATE .0099*** .0015 .0066* .0059 .0069**
(.0024) (.0036) (.0038) (.0039) (.0035)
%BUSINESS .0024 .0076* .0002 .0014 .0031
(.0029) (.0039) (.0042) (.0042) (.0039)
MBHC .0034*** .0043*** .0058*** .0060*** .0028**
(.0008) (.0015) (.0015) (.0016) (.0012)
THRIFT .0104*** .0102*** .0117*** .0112*** .0135***
(.0012) (.0024) (.0023) (.0025) (.0019)
OCC .0021*** .0024 .0030* .0030* .0030**
(.0008) (.0016) (.0015) (.0017) (.0012)
JOBGROWTH .0929 .0748 .0217 .0254 .0292
(.0772) (.0704) (.0582) (.0603) (.0483)
N 4742 4742 4742 4742 4742
Adjusted R2 .4453
Log likelihood 24848 25451 25590 26792
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TABLE A2 Results for Equation (1) Using the Survivor Data Set,
with ROA the Dependent Variable
Random Effects Model
OLS Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept .1695*** .2128*** .2071*** .2175*** .1337***
(.0053) (.0086) (.0091) (.0095) (.0076)
INB .0238*** .0289*** .0303*** .0319*** .0139***
(.0031) (.0060) (.0057) (.0062) (.0047)
lnAGE .0140*** .0122*** .0147*** .0147*** .0155***
(.0005) (.0008) (.0008) (.0008) (.0008)
lnASSETS .0113*** .0162*** .0153*** .0163*** .0082***
(.0005) (.0008) (.0009) (.0009) (.0007)
QUARTER1 .0033*** .0050*** .0035*** .0039*** .0025***
(.0009) (.0008) (.0007) (.0007) (.0006)
QUARTER2 .0029*** .0037*** .0027*** .0029*** .0019***
(.0009) (.0007) (.0006) (.0006) (.0005)
QUARTER3 .0038*** .0040*** .0030*** .0033*** .0025***
(.0009) (.0007) (.0005) (.0005) (.0004)
YEAR98 .0023 .0008 .0039** .0038** .0054***
(.0018) (.0015) (.0017) (.0016) (.0019)
YEAR99 .0005 .0036** .0029 .0022 .0049**
(.0017) (.0017) (.0020) (.0020) (.0023)
YEAR00 .0007 .0050** .0026 .0014 .0044*
(.0017) (.0021) (.0023) (.0023) (.0026)
YEAR01 .0013 .0097*** .0012 .0031 .0007
(.0020) (.0025) (.0027) (.0028) (0029)
ALLOWANCE 1.4814*** 1.5435*** 2.2513*** 2.1837*** 1.7184***
(.1129) (.1405) (.1590) (.1559) (.1206)
LOANS .0327*** .0440*** .0333*** .0345*** .0279***
(.0020) (.0027) (.0029) (.0029) (.0024)
%REALESTATE .0091*** .0026 .0066* .0064* .0061*
(.0024) (.0035) (.0038) (.0038) (.0034)
%BUSINESS .0022 .0063 .0005 .0005 .0033
(.0029) (.0039) (.0041) (.0042) (.0038)
MBHC .0037*** .0046*** .0063*** .0064*** .0028**
(.0008) (.0015) (.0015) (.0016) (.0011)
THRIFT .0097*** .0099*** .0112*** .0108*** .0128***
(.0012) (.0024) (.0023) (.0025) (.0018)
OCC .0022*** .0025 .0032** .0031* .0030***
(.0008) (.0016) (.0015) (.0017) (.0012)
JOBGROWTH .0886 .0776 .0168 .0265 .0292
(.0758) (.0697) (.0570) (.0591) (.0469)
N 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721
Adjusted R2 .4482
Log likelihood 24892 25561 25691 27002
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TABLE A3 Results for Equation (2) Using the Full Data Set,
with ROA the Dependent Variable
Random Effects Model
OLS Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept .1678*** .2110*** .2039*** .2153*** .1376***
(.0054) (.0087) (.0091) (.0096) (.0078)
Internet bank 1 .0037 v.0101 .0077 .0082 .0038
(.0118) (.0179) (.0191) (.0198) (.0204)
Internet bank 2 .0327*** .0348** .0407*** .0422*** .0215**
(.0065) (.0162) (.0139) (.0157) (.0102)
Internet bank 3 .0122* .0259 .0235* .0294* .0177*
(.0067) (.0165) (.0141) (.0160) (.0105)
Internet bank 4 .1077*** .1154*** .1180*** .1207*** .1056***
(.0067) (.0164) (.0141) (.0159) (.0103)
Internet bank 5 .0073 .0158 .0096 .0133 .0012
(.0102) (.0174) (.0180) (.0191) (.0167)
Internet bank 6 .0431*** .0482*** .0494*** .0510** .0471**
(.0118) (.0179) (.0191) (.0199) (.0204)
Internet bank 7 .0543*** .0512*** .0596*** .0573*** .0405***
(.0078) (.0167) (.0156) (.0173) (.0126)
Internet bank 8 .0744*** .0764*** .0971*** .0907*** .1156***
(.0102) (.0173) (.0179) (.0190) (.0166)
Internet bank 9 .0289*** .0313* .0362*** .0407** .0076
(.0066) (.0164) (.0140) (.0158) (.0103)
Internet bank 10 .0390*** .0446** .0448** .0444** .0313
(.0118) (.0178) (.0190) (.0198) (.0203)
Internet bank 11 .0139 .0131 .0167 .0159 .0103
(.0091) (.0169) (.0170) (.0184) (.0152)
Internet bank 12 .0299*** .0364** .0335** .0351** .0151
(.0084) (.0167) (.0162) (.0177) (.0130)
lnAGE .0141*** .0122*** .0147*** .0146*** .0156***
(.0005) (.0008) (.0008) (.0008) (.0008)
lnASSETS .0113*** .0162*** .0150*** .0162*** .0084***
(.0005) (.0008) (.0009) (.0009) (.0007)
QUARTER1 .0034*** .0052*** .0036*** .0041*** .0027***
(.0009) (.0008) (.0007) (.0007) (.0006)
QUARTER2 .0030*** .0037*** .0028*** .0030*** .0020***
(.0009) (.0007) (.0006) (.0006) (.0005)
QUARTER3 .0037*** .0039*** .0028*** .0032*** .0024***
(.0009) (.0007) (.0005) (.0005) (.0004)
YEAR98 .0024 .0009 .0038** .0039** .0057***
(.0018) (.0015) (.0017) (.0016) (.0020)
YEAR99 .0004 .0034** .0027 .0022 .0049**
(.0017) (.0017) (.0020) (.0020) (.0024)
YEAR00 .0009 .0047** .0025 .0014 .0046*
(.0017) (.0021) (.0023) (.0024) (.0026)
YEAR01 .0013 .0095*** .0015 .0032 .0007
(.0020) (.0025) (.0027) (.0028) (.0029)
ALLOWANCE 1.4877*** 1.5305*** 2.2353*** 2.1640*** 1.7392***
(.1138) (.1422) (.1609) (.1582) (.1233)
LOANS .0324*** .0436*** .0337*** .0350*** .0284***
(.0021) (.0027) (.0029) (.0029) (.0025)
%REALESTATE .0083*** .0012 .0059 .0054 .0075**
(.0024) (.0036) (.0038) (.0039) (.0034)
%BUSINESS .0011 .0079** .0005 .0019 .0041
(.0029) (.0039) (.0042) (.0042) (.0039)
942 Journal of Business
which requires two disturbance parameters to be estimated. Random effects re-
gression model (2) imposes the following ‘‘first-order autoregressive’’ structure
on the portion of the variance-covariance matrix corresponding to bank i:
6ð2Þ ¼
s2 s2r s2r2    s2r9
s2r s2 s2r    s2r8





   ..
.






which also requires two disturbance parameters to be estimated. Random effects
regression model (3) imposes the following ‘‘Toeplitz’’ structure on the portion of
the variance-covariance matrix corresponding to bank i:
6ð3Þ ¼
s2 s1 s2    s9
s1 s2 s1    s8












which requires 10 disturbance parameters to be estimated. Finally, random effects
regression model (4) imposes an ‘‘unstructured’’ structure on the portion of the
variance-covariance matrix corresponding to bank i:
6ð4Þ ¼
s21 s21 s31    s91
s21 s22 s32    s92





   ..
.






TABLE A3 (Continued )
Random Effects Model
OLS Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)
MBHC .0037*** .0046*** .0062*** .0063*** .0030***
(.0008) (.0015) (.0015) (.0016) (.0012)
THRIFT .0101*** .0102*** .0116*** .0111*** .0133***
(.0012) (.0025) (.0023) (.0025) (.0019)
OCC .0023*** .0027* .0033** .0033** .0034***
(.0008) (.0016) (.0015) (.0017) (.0012)
JOBGROWTH .0865 .0713 .0213 .0234 .0292
(.0763) (.0704) (.0582) (.0602) (.0483)
N 4742 4742 4742 4742 4742
Adjusted R2 .4643
Log likelihood 24816 25433 25563 26792
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TABLE A4 Results for Equation (3) Using the Full Data Set,
with ROA the Dependent Variable
Random Effects Model
OLS Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept .1682*** .2100*** .2039*** .2146*** .1393***
(.0055) (.0090) (.0094) (.0099) (.0081)
INB .0664** .1103** .1344** .1430*** .0891*
(0310) (.0443) (.0540) (.0547) (.0505)
lnAGE .0139*** .0122*** .0147*** .0146*** .0159***
(.0006) (.0008) (.0008) (.0008) (.0009)
lnAGE * INB .0040 .0062 .0080 .0079 .0007
(.0040) (.0046) (.0054) (.0053) (.0059)
lnASSETS .0111*** .0160*** .0150*** .0160*** .0087***
(.0005) (.0009) (.0009) (.0009) (.0007)
lnASSETS * INB .0027 .0064 .0082* .0089* .0050
(.0028) (.0041) (.0049) (.0050) (.0046)
QUARTER1 .0035*** .0052*** .0037*** .0041*** .0029***
(.0009) (.0008) (.0007) (.0007) (.0006)
QUARTER2 .0030*** .0037*** .0028*** .0031*** .0022***
(.0009) (.0007) (.0007) (.0006) (.0005)
QUARTER3 .0037*** .0039*** .0028*** .0032*** .0025***
(.0009) (.0007) (.0005) (.0005) (.0004)
YEAR98 .0024 .0009 .0037** .0038** .0052***
(.0018) (.0015) (.0017) (.0016) (.0019)
YEAR99 .0007 .0036** .0025 .0019 .0042*
(.0018) (.0017) (.0020) (.0020) (.0023)
YEAR00 .0006 .0050** .0023 .0011 .0036
(.0018) (.0021) (.0023) (.0024) (.0026)
YEAR01 .0016 .0098*** .0017 .0036 .0007
(.0020) (.0026) (.0027) (.0028) (0029)
ALLOWANCE 1.4469*** 1.5172*** 2.2422*** 2.1592*** 1.7520***
(.1153) (.1430) (.1624) (.1589) (.1263)
LOANS .0338*** .0443*** .0345*** .0358*** .0286***
(.0021) (.0027) (.0029) (.0029) (.0025)
%REALESTATE .0099*** .0015 .0065* .0058 .0067*
(.0024) (.0036) (.0038) (.0039) (.0035)
%BUSINESS .0025 .0076* .0001 .0015 .0028
(.0029) (.0039) (.0042) (.0042) (.0039)
MBHC .0034*** .0043*** .0058*** .0059*** .0027**
(.0008) (.0015) (.0015) (.0016) (.0012)
THRIFT .0104*** .0103*** .0118*** .0114*** .0136***
(.0012) (.0024) (.0023) (.0025) (.0019)
OCC .0021*** .0024 .0030* .0030* .0030**
(.0008) (.0016) (.0015) (.0017) (.0012)
JOBGROWTH .0914 .0802 .0249 .0296 .0286
(.0773) (.0709) (.0583) (.0605) (.0484)
N 4742 4742 4742 4742 4742
Adjusted R2 .4452
Log likelihood 24832 25436 25576 26776
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TABLE A5 Results for Equation (3) Using the Survivor Data Set,
with ROA the Dependent Variable
Random Effects Model
OLS Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept .1676*** .2102*** .2040*** .2139*** .1337***
(.0054) (.0088) (.0092) (.0096) (.0077)
INB .1016*** .0655 .1346** .1422** .0025
(.0339) (.0485) (.0579) (.0584) (.0542)
lnAGE .0140*** .0123*** .0148*** .0148*** .0154***
(.0005) (.0008) (.0008) (.0008) (.0008)
lnAGE * INB .0004 .0014 .0023 0.0022 .0062
(.0045) (.0055) (.0061) (.0059) (.0068)
lnASSETS .0112*** .0160*** .0150*** .0159*** .0082***
(.0005) (.0008) (.0009) (.0009) (.0007)
lnASSETS * INB .0065** .0030 .0091* .0096* .0018
(.0031) (.0045) (.0052) (.0053) (.0049)
QUARTER1 .0033*** .0050*** .0035*** .0039*** .0025***
(.0009) (.0008) (.0007) (.0007) (.0006)
QUARTER2 .0029*** .0037*** .0027*** .0029*** .0019***
(.0009) (.0007) (.0006) (.0006) (.0005)
QUARTER3 .0038*** .0040*** .0030*** .0033*** .0025***
(.0009) (.0007) (.0005) (.0005) (.0004)
YEAR98 .0024 .0009 .0039** .0039** .0054***
(.0018) (.0015) (.0017) (.0016) (.0019)
YEAR99 .0004 .0035** .0029 .0022 .0049**
(.0017) (.0017) (.0020) (.0020) (.0023)
YEAR00 .0008 .0049** .0026 .0014 .0045*
(.0017) (.0021) (.0023) (.0023) (.0026)
YEAR01 .0012 .0095*** .0012 .0030 .0008
(.0020) (.0025) (.0027) (.0028) (.0029)
ALLOWANCE 1.4813*** 1.5312*** 2.2534*** 2.1855*** 1.7139***
(.1128) (.1407) (.1590) (.1558) (.1207)
LOANS .0328*** .0439*** .0334*** .0346*** .0278***
(.0020) (.0027) (.0029) (.0029) (.0024)
%REALESTATE .0089*** .0025 .0063* .0062 .0061*
(.0024) (.0035) (.0038) (.0038) (.0034)
%BUSINESS .0019 .0065* .0001 .0008 .0033
(.0029) (.0039) (.0041) (.0042) (.0038)
MBHC .0037*** .0046*** .0063*** .0063*** .0028**
(.0008) (.0015) (.0015) (.0016) (.0011)
THRIFT .0097*** .0099*** .0113*** .0109*** .0127***
(.0012) (.0024) (.0023) (.0025) (.0018)
OCC .0022*** .0025 .0031** .0031* .0030***
(.0008) (.0016) (.0015) (.0017) (.0012)
JOBGROWTH .0941 .0704 .0154 .0243 .0273
(.0758) (.0700) (.0571) (.0592) (.0469)
N 4721 4721 4721 4721 4721
Adjusted R2 .4488
Log likelihood 24875 25547 25678 26986
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which requires 45 disturbance parameters to be estimated. Regardless of random
effects structure, the full variance-covariance matrix has the following block di-
agonal structure:
VC ¼
6 0 0    0
0 6 0    0





   ..
.






A more-detailed presentation of these four variance-covariance structures can
be found in the SAS/STAT user’s guide, version 8 (Cary, NC: SAS Institute, 1999),
pp. 2133–45. Amore-complete discussion of random effects models can be found in
Greene (1997), pp, 623–35.
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